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ARTICLES
EVERY JUROR WANTS A STORY:
NARRATIVE RELEVANCE, THIRD PARTY GUILT AND THE
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSEt
John H. Blume*, Sheri L. Johnson** and Emily C. Paavola***
ABSTRACT
On occasion, criminal defendants hope to convince a jury that the state has not
met its burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by offering
evidence that someone else (a third party) committed the crime. Currently, state
and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third party guilt using a
variety of standards. In general, however, there are two basic approaches. Many
state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of some sort of "direct link" or
connection between a specific third party and the crime. A second group of state
courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence of third party guilt if it is relevant
under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, or its state equivalent, and not excluded by
other rules of evidence, such as 403. While some scholars have lauded the 401/403
approach as the better test, in practice the two tests operate in much the same way
and the evidentiary "bottom line" is that the defendant's evidence is frequently
deemed inadmissible. Courts have offered two justifications for the strict restric-
tions on third party guilt evidence: (1) to prevent juror confusion and (2) to guard
against fabricated statements by third parties. We explain why these fears are
unfounded, and then turn to the focus of this Article: the importance of narrative
relevance. Existing evidentiary restrictions fail to consider the role third party
guilt evidence plays in shaping the narrative, or story, that the defendant will
present to the jury in his defense. Empirical studies have shown that-more than
legal standards, definitions or instructions-narrative plays a key role in the juror
decision-making process. Without a thorough understanding and consideration of
the narrative relevance of third party guilt evidence, restrictions on its use cannot
be and are not being appropriately applied because they fail to account for the way
in which jurors actually think and process information at trial.
After discussing the importance of narrative relevance, we propose a new test
which is more consistent with a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and
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to present a complete defense. First, the threshold test for admissibility should be
probable cause. If the evidence proffered by the defendant would permit the state to
proceed with a criminal prosecution against the third party, then the defendant
must be permitted to tell the story of third party guilt. A story for the goose is a
story for the gander Once the threshold test is satisfied, we propose that, with one
significant exception, a defendant should be permitted to admit third party guilt
evidence if that same evidence would be admissible against the third party were he
the defendant. The exception is propensity evidence, as there is no need to balance
the probative value of the third party guilt evidence against the danger of unfair
prejudice because the third party suffers no prejudice by the admission of the
evidence at a trial in which he is not the accused. Thus, admission of propensity (or
other character) evidence concerning a third party should not be precluded.
"The universe is made of stories, not of atoms."'
INTRODUCTION
Bobby Lee Holmes was well known by the York, South Carolina police
department as a troublemaker.2 Just eighteen years old, he stood six feet, two
inches tall and was an athletic 235 pounds. He did not appreciate that Officer
Grady Harper was trying to break up his New Year's Eve party. This was not the
first time Harper or other police officers had trouble with Holmes. And the local
gendarmes suspected that Holmes was involved in a series of local thefts for which
they had secured arrest warrants.3
On this particular occasion, December 31, 1989, Officer Harper responded to a
call regarding a disturbance at the Cannon Court apartment complex and found
Holmes drinking beer and arguing loudly with another man in a crowded parking
lot.4 Harper told the group to break it up and go home.5 Most complied, but
Holmes was not one to go quietly. He refused to leave and chose instead to taunt
Harper with what Harper thereafter described as "a few choice words."6
Harper went back to his car and called for backup. Instead of waiting around for
additional officers to arrest him, Holmes jumped into the back seat of his friend
1. Muriel Rukeyser, The Speed of Darkness, in A MuRiEL RuKEYSER READER 228, 231 (Jan Heller Levi ed.,
1994).
2. See Joint Appendix Vol. I at 164-66, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327), 2005
WL 3279664 [hereinafter Joint Appendix Vol. I]. In keeping with the Article's topic, the facts of the Holmes case
are relayed in a narrative fashion. The authors assisted in Mr. Holmes's defense and certain details derive from
their knowledge of the case and may not appear in the Joint Appendix or Transcript of Record.
3. See id. at 179-80, 183-85, 188; Joint Appendix Vol. II at 264, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727
(2006) (No. 04-1327), 2005 WL 3279666 [hereinafter Joint Appendix Vol. 1].
4. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 163-65.
5. See id. at 165.
6. See id. at 172-73.
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Terrance Digsby's car and the two fled.7 Within minutes, however, Harper and his
backup caught up with the two men and signaled the car to stop. As Digsby
brought the car to a halt, Holmes jumped out and ran again.8 Harper stayed with
the car and arrested Digsby while the backup officers pursued Holmes. As Holmes
darted in front of the officers' patrol car and rounded the comer of a churchyard,
the officers jumped from the car and pursued him on foot.9 They chased Holmes
until he ran through some tall weeds near the roadside, jumped into a ditch, and
disappeared. It was 5:20 a.m.'
Sometime later that morning, between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m., Mary Stewart heard
someone knocking at the front door. Ms. Stewart was eighty-six years old and
lived in an apartment about a mile from Cannon Court. When she opened the door,
an unidentified man burst into Ms. Stewart's home and began to beat her in the
head while demanding money. Ms. Stewart told him that her money was in her
purse. The perpetrator took forty dollars from the purse and then pushed her into
the bedroom where he anally raped her.t t Then, the man tore the telephone from
the wall in Ms. Stewart's living room and left. When her attacker was gone, Ms.
Stewart took a shower "to get the nasty off' and called her friend, Maggie
Thrasher.12 Ms. Thrasher called another friend, Alaine Byers, who drove to the
police department for help. 13 Ms. Stewart lived long enough to describe her
attacker as "a short, dark skinned fellow, chunky wide," in his late twenties, and
with "kind of long hair," 14 but a head injury she sustained during the attack
eventually caused her to fall into a coma.15 She died ten weeks later, having never
regained consciousness. 16
The first officers to arrive at the scene began collecting evidence from Ms.
Stewart's apartment.1 7 Officer Dale Edwards collected a single paper towel from
Ms. Stewart with which she had cleaned herself after the attack. 18 Edwards also
gathered Ms. Stewart's nightgown, robe, and slippers from the bathroom floor
where she had dropped them and tossed them into a brown paper bag he found
under her kitchen sink.' 9 Lieutenant Barnett helped Edwards to fold Ms. Stewart's
7. See id. at 169, 177-78.
8. See id. at 170-71.
9. See id. at 170-71, 174.
10. See id. at 175.
11. See id. at 141-42.
12. Transcript of Record at 2183, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327) [hereinafter
Transcript of Record] (on file with author); see also Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 141.
13. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 2162-63, 2167-68.
14. Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 142, 149, 159. Both Ms. Stewart and Bobby Lee Holmes are
African-American.
15. See Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 3, at 248.
16. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 3600.
17. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 156-57.
18. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 2186.
19. See id. at 2201, 2215, 2184.
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bed sheets and pillow cases and placed them together in another paper bag. Neither
man wore gloves.20
At 8:46 a.m., Captain William Mobley arrived and took charge of the investiga-
tion. He locked himself inside the apartment and told the other officers to leave so
that he could finish processing the scene by himself.21 Alone inside the apartment,
Captain Mobley took photographs and dusted for fingerprints. He collected
additional evidence, including a second paper towel which he claimed to have
found in Ms. Stewart's bathroom trash can.22 Like Edwards and Barnett, Mobley
failed to wear gloves throughout the evidence collection process. Captain Mobley
took all of the evidence he had gathered back to his office and placed it on his desk
where, the next day, he inventoried it by sifting through the bags and documenting
it in an evidence log. Again, Mobley did not wear gloves, nor did he wash his
hands between handling individual items of evidence.23
Back at the station, Officer Harper reported that Bobby Lee Holmes had eluded
police that morning at Cannon Court, about a mile from Ms. Stewart's home. By
11:30 a.m., Captain Mobley had decided that Holmes, the known troublemaker
who had gotten away, was his prime suspect in Ms. Stewart's attack. 4 Mobley did
not waste time. Although he had no evidence linking Holmes to the crime, Mobley
set out immediately to find him. At 2:00 p.m. that same day, Mobley and Sergeant
James Smith found Holmes at home with his father in their apartment and arrested
him-ostensibly not for the assault on Ms. Stewart, and not for his conduct early
that morning when he ran from police, but for the outstanding theft warrant.
25
Holmes was asleep in his bedroom. Mobley later testified that Bobby's father,
Willie Holmes, showed the officers to the bedroom door: "the door opened and
Bobby Holmes was standing there. He had on a black hooded kind of pull-over
type sweat shirt on and was in his underwear and white socks on."26
Mobley told Holmes he was under arrest and directed him to get dressed:
"While he was getting dressed, Sergeant Smith was standing there and noticed a
blue and white striped tank top laying in a chair at the foot of the bed. And at that
time Sergeant Smith noted to me that it appeared the tank top had some blood on
it."
27
The officers asked Holmes where the blood had come from and he told them he
had been in a fight the night before: "As a result of that, we asked both Willie
Holmes and them if they had any objection if we took that tank top with us." 28
20. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 148, 157-58.
21. See id. at 180-81; Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 3, at 206-07.
22. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 2483.
23. See id. at 2559-63.
24. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 183.
25. See id. at 179-80.
26. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 2511.
27. Id. at 2512.
28. Id.
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Willie Holmes supposedly said it was fine for the officers to take the shirt.
Bobby Holmes said nothing. At the station, the officers also took the blue jeans,
black sweatshirt, socks and underwear that Holmes was wearing at the time.29 The
investigation was essentially over in less than twenty-four hours. Two months
later, the State charged Holmes with criminal sexual conduct, robbery, burglary
and murder.30 The prosecutor subsequently filed a notice of his intention to seek
the death penalty. Although the prosecution offered Holmes a very favorable plea
bargain which would have resulted in his release after just a few years incarcera-
tion, Holmes said no and demanded a jury trial.
Lacking a confession or any eyewitness testimony, the State's case against
Holmes was based entirely on forensic evidence. First, the State presented
evidence that Holmes's palm print had been found on the interior side of Ms.
Stewart's apartment door. Captain Mobley told the jury that when he dusted Ms.
Stewart's apartment for fingerprints, he lifted two usable prints-a partial palm
print on the interior side of the door, and a second palm print located on the
exterior side. 31 Mobley stated that he sent both prints to the State Law Enforce-
ment Division ("SLED") for processing. SLED Agent Steven Derrick later
testified that he examined both prints and found that the interior palm print
matched the inked standards taken from Bobby Holmes.3 2 The exterior print was
never identified.
Second, SLED Agent John Barron testified that three sets of consistent fibers
indicated contact between Ms. Stewart and Holmes. Agent Barron described how
he searched for fiber evidence by hanging each piece of evidence over a table and
scraping the fibers onto a sheet of paper:
[O]ur policy is to deal with one bag of evidence at a time in what we call a
clean room, in which the evidence is placed or hung over a clean piece of
paper. And the evidence then is picked and scraped for the evidence. The
evidence that is found, that is recovered, then is secured. Then the area is
cleaned and a new piece of paper is placed down and then another bag of
evidence is then processed.33
Agent Barron mounted any fibers that he "believe[d to be] probative" on micro-
scope slides and visually compared them for similarities in size, shape and color.3 4
He found three sets of fibers which he believed indicated that some of Bobby
Holmes's clothing came into contact with items recovered from Ms. Stewart's
apartment. First, Agent Barron told the jury that he scraped several black cotton
29. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 186.
30. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 182-83.
31. See id.
32. See Joint Appendix Vol. 11, supra note 3, at 209-11.
33. Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 2975-76.
34. Id. at 2976.
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and polyester fibers from Ms. Stewart's bed sheets. He compared these fibers with
black fibers taken from Holmes's hooded sweatshirt and determined that they were
consistent. Similarly, Barron testified that he also found a set of blue acrylic fibers
on Ms. Stewart's nightgown which were consistent with the fibers from Holmes's
blue jeans. Barron also stated that he had found several brown and gold fibers on
Ms. Stewart's nightgown and a similar lump of brown and gold fibers on Holmes's
underwear. Both the nightgown and the underwear, he opined, likely came into
contact with some third source containing brown and gold fibers. Agent Barron did
not attempt to locate this unidentified source.35
Finally, FBI Agent Lawrence Presley testified that a spot of blood on Holmes's
blue and white striped tank top contained Ms. Stewart's DNA. FBI Agent Frank
Baechtel told the jury that a second round of tests confirmed that the striped tank
top contained Ms. Stewart's blood. In fact, Baechtel stated that he had found a
mixture of both Ms. Stewart's and Holmes's blood on the tank top, on the paper
towel recovered at the scene by Captain Mobley, and on Holmes's underwear.
Baechtel closed his testimony by telling the jury that the odds of finding another
African-American, other than Bobby Holmes, whose DNA could have contributed
to these mixtures was 1 in 72 million.36 "Essentially, what that means," Baechtel
explained, "is 99.999999 percent of the population is excluded as to the possible
contributor to that [blood] stains."3 7 On that high note, the State rested its case.
Holmes's attorneys told the jury that their client was the victim of a rush to
judgment resulting from a sloppy investigation by law enforcement officers who
failed to pursue other, more credible leads. These same officers, the defense
contended, incompetently, and possibly maliciously, collected and tested the
forensic evidence. In fact, the defense pointed at Captain Mobley as a potential
villain, claiming he had both the motive and the opportunity to plant forensic
evidence against Holmes.
With respect to the palm print, former SLED Agent Donald Girndt testified that
it was standard procedure to take complete "orienting photos" of all lifted prints to
show their precise location at the scene.38 In this case, however, Captain Mobley
failed to properly photograph the prints and, since he processed the scene alone,
there was no way to prove that the print actually came from Ms. Stewart's door.
Moreover, Girndt noted that a series of vertical lines running through the print
found on the interior side of the door (attributed to Holmes) were not present on the
print found on the exterior side of the door (the unidentified print). This discrep-
ancy, he explained, meant that the two prints did not come from the same surface.
The vertical lines were of the type likely to be found on a rough, unpainted
35. See Joint Appendix Vol. U, supra note 3, at 226-32.
36. See Transcript of Record, supra note 12, at 3528.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3940-43.
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surface-not on the smooth painted door of Ms. Stewart's apartment. 39 This,
Holmes's attorneys argued, was evidence of fabrication.
With respect to the State's fiber evidence, defense expert John Kilbourn testified
that, in general, it was of low probative value because the particular fibers in this
case are so commonly produced:
[Here,] where we have a black sweat shirt having black cotton fibers and black
polyester fibers, we basically do not have any way of knowing how many
hundreds or thousands of those black sweat shirts were produced by this
company .... Furthermore, we don't know how many other companies use
these black fibers to also make black sweat shirts. And we also don't know how
many other types of garments might have been made with the same color,
40black polyester and cotton ....
Kilbourn also stated that SLED Agent Barron should have used the "taping
method" of fiber collection, in which the fibers are lifted off of evidence with wide
pieces of cellophane tape, rather than the scraping method because scraping
creates a greater risk of cross-contamination, especially where, as in this case,
multiple items of evidence were scraped by the same technician, on the same day,
and in the same room. Finally, Kilbourn testified that he had examined the fibers
collected by Agent Barron and Barron's test results, and in his opinion, there was
no evidence to suggest that any of the items collected from Ms. Stewart's
apartment had come into contact with Bobby Holmes's clothing.41
Finally, several defense experts addressed the State's DNA evidence. Janine
Arvizu, a lab quality assurance consultant, told the jury that the integrity of the
blood test results was seriously jeopardized because (1) the chemicals inside the
rape kit tubes used to collect Ms. Stewart's blood had expired, causing the blood
inside to become too degraded to test; (2) as a result, SLED agents had used a piece
of blood-covered cloth cut from Ms. Stewart's nightgown as a "known" sample of
her blood when, in fact, it was not a pure sample; (3) moreover, a tube of Ms.
Stewart's blood from a second rape kit had been lost and SLED agents had failed to
test the remaining items of evidence for chemicals which would verify that the lost
tube had not been used to falsely deposit Ms. Stewart's blood on other items of
evidence, such as Holmes's clothing; and, (4) the officers' failure to wear gloves,
particularly Captain Mobley's failure when he inventoried all of the evidence at
once, created a risk that they could have transferred DNA from one item of42
evidence to the other with their hands. Dr. Peter D'Eustachio agreed that the high
risk of contamination in this case rendered the test results unreliable.43 Aside from
39. Id. at 3990-93.
40. Id. at 3895.
41. See id. at 3898-99.
42. See id. at 3760-70.
43. See id. at 3804-06, 3814.
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the risk of contamination, however, he testified that he had examined the test
results and found that they did not, in fact, reveal a mixture of Holmes's and Ms.
Stewart's DNA.44 The mixture, he found, contained results which neither Holmes's
nor Ms. Stewart's DNA could produce as well as other irregularities that could not
be explained:
At the end of the day, it's unreliable tests .... [I]t wasn't handled in the way
that we now know is necessary to prevent contamination from one item to the
next or from outside sources. Known samples, which should clearly give us
high quality views of those peoples [sic] DNA were clearly degraded. Known
samples were handled too close together in time and place with some unknown
samples. And finally, there are some features of the-where the tracings need
to be completely interpreted and accounted for in order to be scientifically
reliable. There are some features of those tracings that did not get interpreted,
and it adds up to a test that is not reliable.4 5
Prosecutor Tommy Pope scoffed at the suggestion that Holmes had been framed
and argued that Holmes's attorneys were simply trying to blow smoke by
complaining about violations of protocol. "What you have got to do is take from
the stand what you heard, apply your common sense and find the truth of the
matter," he told the jury.46 "[I]f you are going to frame [somebody], and it's going
to be Bobby Holmes, where is this raping, murdering, beating fellow that actually
did this thing?
' 47
No doubt this is exactly the question the jurors had been asking themselves. If
the test results were wrong---contaminated, misapplied, or even fabricated-and
Bobby Holmes was innocent, who was the real killer? Holmes had offered them no
alternative story. He must have done it. The jury convicted him of murder and
sentenced him to death.
What the jury did not know was that Holmes did indeed have an alternative
story to tell-but he was judicially silenced. The defense team had amassed a
wealth of evidence implicating another man, Jimmy McCaw White, as Ms.
Stewart's killer. White was a local African-American with a long police record and
a history of violence.4 8 He was twenty-two years old and wore his hair in a long
shag.49 While Bobby Holmes was partying with his friends a few blocks away, Ms.
Meshelley Gilmore saw Jimmy White standing in the parking lot across from Ms.
Stewart's apartment as she drove away from her home around 4:00 a.m.50 He was
still standing there, Ms. Gilmore reported, when she returned to her home
44. See id. at 3824-25.
45. Id. at 3826-27.
46. Id. at 4206.
47. Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 3, at 338.
48. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 74-80 (recording White's testimony).
49. See id. at 14; Joint Appendix Vol. 11, supra note 3, at 360.
50. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 12.
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approximately forty-five minutes later.51 Ms. Frenetta Jamison and Ms. Delores
Brown both saw White walking toward Ms. Stewart's apartment complex between
4:00 and 5:00 a.m. as they each made their way home from separate places.52
Eighty-seven year old Annie Boyd, who lived next door to Ms. Stewart, never
actually saw Jimmy White on the morning of Ms. Stewart's attack, but she was
certain she had heard him when a man knocked on her door during the night and
said, "Open the door my man, this is Jimmy, open the door."53
Ms. Brown and Ms. Gilmore reported to the police that White was in the right
place at the right time to have committed the crime. 4 Captain Mobley sent an
officer to talk to White. White claimed he was nowhere near Ms. Stewart's
apartment at the time of the attack. He was certain of this because an acquaintance
named Joshua Lytle had given him a ride from a bar to his home in Sharon, South
Carolina more than four hours before the assault occurred. 55 That was good
enough for the York police department. It did not matter that Joshua Lytle said he
never gave White a ride.56 Why waste their time? They had their man.
Feeling secure in Holmes's arrest, White began to boast that he had gotten away
with murder. Rumors spread around town that White was the real killer. White's
friend, Ken Rhodes, approached him and asked him if the word on the street was
true. 7 In response White dropped his head, raised it back up and said coyly, "Well,
you know I like older women. 5 8 Then White admitted that he had done "what they
say I did" and bragged that someone else was going to "burn" for it. White added,
however, that he did not kill the lady. He knew he had not killed her because he
remembered that she was alive when he left her apartment. 59 White made similar
statements to Mattie Mae Scott and Thomas Murray.60 White was later incarcer-
ated on unrelated charges and housed with Steven Westbrook, to whom he also
confessed.61 White also told Westbrook that a York police officer had advised him
to keep quiet about the Stewart murder.62 In addition, there was evidence that
White more closely matched Ms. Stewart's description of her perpetrator because
White was older, shorter, and had long hair while Holmes's hair was closely
cropped.63
Holmes proffered this evidence at a pre-trial hearing. The State argued that
51. See id. at 13.
52. See id. at 5-9, 95-98.
53. Id. at 30.
54. See id. at 14-15,98-99.
55. See id. at 80-86.
56. See id. at 134.
57. See id. at 119.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 120-21.
60. See id. at 106-07, 114-15.
61. See id. at 38-43.
62. See id. at 41-42.
63. See id. at 14, 199; Joint Appendix Vol. II, supra note 3, at 360.
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South Carolina's evidentiary restrictions on the admissibility of third party guilt
evidence rendered the evidence inadmissible. The trial judge was conflicted. The
applicable rule, he noted, comes from State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532 (S.C. 1941),
under which evidence of a third party's guilt is admissible if it is inconsistent with
the defendant's own guilt and raises a reasonable presumption of the defendant's
innocence. 64 "At first blush," the judge admitted, the White evidence seemed to
satisfy the Gregory standard because a reasonable jury could conclude from
Holmes's proffered evidence that White was in the proximity of Ms. Stewart's
home near the time of the crime, that White lied about his alibi, and that White
confessed to at least four witnesses that he beat and raped Mary Stewart. 65 There
was also evidence, however marginal, that White had a motive to commit the crime
66 trabecause of his "penchant" for older women. The trial judge was particularly
"bother[ed]" by White's confessions because they "rise to the level of raising some
question about [Holmes's guilt]."
67
The problem, however, was that the trial judge erroneously believed that
White's confession statements were inadmissible hearsay.68 White's confessions
were, of course, the "engine" that drove the third party guilt "train. 69 Without
them, the trial court held that the remaining evidence against White was not
sufficient to create a reasonable presumption of Holmes's innocence.70 Thus, the
entirety of the evidence Holmes had collected concerning White's guilt was
excluded from trial. Without the White evidence, Holmes was left with an
64. See Joint Appendix Vol. I, supra note 2, at 133-34.
65. See id. at 134-35.
66. See id. at 135. The evidence included, (1) Ken Rhodes's testimony that White liked older women; (2)
Jimmy White's own admission that he had a history of violence against women, including striking a woman in the
face and pushing his girlfriend to the ground; and (3) a psychological evaluation of White concluding that he bore
scars from physical altercations with both women and men and that he had sexual fantasies of dominance and
control causing him to behave inappropriately and unpredictably. Id. at 74-79, 90-93, 119, 132.
67. Id. at 141.
68. See id. at 135. The trial judge ruled that White's statements were hearsay and did not qualify for the hearsay
exception for statements against interest under SOUTH CAROLINA RULE OF EVIDENCE (SCRE) 804(b)(3). This
ruling was clearly erroneous for several reasons. First, under SCRE 801(d)(1)(A), evidence of any inconsistent
statement by a witness who testifies in the trial at issue is exempt from the hearsay rule. Since White testified at the
pre-trial hearing concerning the third party guilt evidence issue and presumably would have testified at trial had
the trial court not prevented Holmes from calling him as a witness, his previous inconsistent statements were not
hearsay. Second, the trial court was also mistaken in its application of SCRE 804(b)(3) governing the "statement
against interest" exception to the hearsay rule because it applies only when the declarant is unavailable to testify at
trial. As already explained, there was no evidence that White was unavailable to testify. Moreover, even if White
had been unavailable, his statements would nonetheless have been admissible under SCRE 804(b)(3), provided
they were sufficiently corroborated. The trial court concluded that White's statements did not satisfy the
corroboration requirement, but drew this conclusion by misconstruing the standard to mean that the content of
White's statements had to be corroborated. The standard is not whether White's statements were true, but whether
they were in fact made at all. State v. McDonald, 540 S.E.2d 464, 466 (S.C. 2000). Since four independent
witnesses were available to testify that White had made confession statements, there was sufficient evidence to
corroborate White's statements.
69. Joint Appendix Vol. 1, supra note 2, at 135.
70. See id. at 137.
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argument but no story: the forensic evidence against him was somehow unreliable.
Obviously, the jury did not buy it.
Holmes appealed and argued that the trial court erred in excluding the White
evidence. The Supreme Court of South Carolina disagreed and affirmed his
conviction and sentence.71 The court noted that in State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541
(S.C. 2001), it had "held that where there is strong evidence of an appellant's guilt,
especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the proffered evidence about a
third party's alleged guilt does not raise a reasonable inference as to the appellant's
own innocence. 7 2 The court then reviewed the State's forensic evidence against
Holmes, ignoring the testimony Holmes had presented to challenge this evidence,
and concluded that he "fail[ed] to meet the standard set out in Gregory and Gay
due to the strong evidence of his guilt. He simply cannot overcome the forensic
evidence against him.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and overturned the South
Carolina court's decision, stating simply that the standard is "arbitrary" and
thereby "violates a criminal defendant's right to have a 'meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense."
74
Just because the prosecution's evidence, if credited, would provide strong
support for a guilty verdict, it does not follow that evidence of third party guilt
has only a weak logical connection to the central issues in the case....
The rule applied in this case is no more logical than its converse would be,
i.e., a rule barring the prosecution from introducing evidence of a defendant's
guilt if the defendant is able to proffer, at a pretrial hearing, evidence that, if
believed, strongly supports a verdict of not guilty. In the present case, for
example, [Holmes] proffered evidence that, if believed, squarely proved that
White... was the perpetrator....
The point is that, by evaluating the strength of only one party's evidence, no
logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary evidence
offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt. Because the rule applied by the
State Supreme Court in this case did not heed this point, the rule is "arbitrary"
in the sense that it does not rationally serve the end that the Gregory rule and
other similar third party guilt rules were designed to further. Nor has the State
identified any other legitimate end that the rule serves. It follows that the rule
applied in this case by the State Supreme Court violates a criminal defendant's
right to have "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense."7 5
The Court issued a similar opinion thirty-two years earlier in Chambers v.
71. State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 2004), vacated and remanded by, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126
S.Ct. 1727 (2006).
72. Id. at 24 (discussing State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 2001)).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Holmes, 126 S.Ct. at 1735 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,690 (1986), which quotes California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,485 (1984)).
75. Id. at 1734-35 (emphasis omitted).
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Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), a decision we will return to in Part III. In neither
opinion, however, has the Court provided a clear explanation as to why such
evidentiary restrictions are unconstitutional. The Court has yet to provide a
comprehensive discussion of what the right to present a defense really means, and
this Article likewise does not attempt to answer that broad question. Our purpose is
narrower: we assert that a proper understanding of the right to present a defense
must include a proper understanding of the narrative relevance of evidence. Part I
of this Article describes the history and current state of third party guilt evidentiary
restrictions. Part II explains our conception of narrative relevance. Part III
describes the various challenges made to third party guilt restrictions including
those successful claims in Chambers and Holmes. Part IV describes how narrative
theory relates to the right to a fair trial and why we should think of evidentiary
restrictions in terms of their narrative relevance. Part V proposes a rule that would
allow for such a narrative relevance consideration in the admission of third party
guilt evidence.
I. EVLDENTIARY RESTRICTIONS ON THRD PARTY GUILT EVIDENCE
Currently, state and federal courts assess the admissibility of evidence of third
party guilt using a variety of standards.7 6 In general, however, there are two basic
approaches. First, many state courts require a defendant to proffer evidence of
some sort of "direct link" or connection between a specific third party and the
crime.7 7 We will refer to these as the "direct connection" states, despite slight
76. Third party guilt evidentiary restrictions have a long history in American jurisprudence. From their
inception up through the mid-1970s, most American courts followed the old English common law rule that
incriminating statements made by a third party were excluded as hearsay and held that only statements against
pecuniary or proprietary interests were "sufficiently reliable to warrant their admission at the trial of someone
other than the declarant." Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 129 (1999) (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S.
243 (1913)). In addition to the rule which categorically refused to recognize any "against penal interest" exception
to the hearsay rule, courts developed special restrictions on the admissibility of third party guilt evidence in
general as early as the 1800s. See, e.g., Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11 (Md. 1880); State v. Fletcher, 33 P. 575
(Or. 1893); Stanley v. State, 89 S.W. 643 (Tex. 1905). These third party guilt evidence rules prevented admission
of not only out-of-court statements by third parties, but other evidence as well. For example, in State v. Fletcher,
the Oregon Supreme Court excluded evidence that a third party had confessed to the crime as well as evidence that
he had a motive to commit the crime, was seen near the scene of the crime shortly after it occurred, and was
wearing clothing matching a witness's description of the perpetrator. Fletcher, 33 P. at 577. Modem third party
guilt evidentiary restrictions apply to a variety of evidence including motive, opportunity, other crimes committed
by the third party, evidence that the third party resembles the accused, or evidence that the third party confessed to
committing the crime. This collection of possibilities is typically lumped together for purposes of evaluating
whether the entirety meets the relevant standard for admissibility of third party guilt evidence. However, even if
the sum of evidence meets the third party guilt standard, it may nonetheless be excluded under other evidence
rules.
77. The "direct link" states include: Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin. For an extensive summary of cases excluding third party guilt evidence under the direct link
approach, see Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the 'Legitimate Tendency' Standard of Admissibility (and
Doesn't Like What He Sees), 55 U. MiAMI L. REv. 1023 (2001).
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variations in the tests.78 Wisconsin, Hawaii and Minnesota, for example, have
adopted the "legitimate tendency test," which asks whether the third party guilt
evidence has a legitimate tendency to connect a third party with the crime.79
Georgia and Missouri similarly require that the evidence connect the third party
with the corpus deliciti of the crime. 80 Thus in Georgia, James Watson, Jr., charged
with murdering a former policeman, could not introduce evidence that another
man, Bobby Gray, was seen fleeing from the scene of the crime and later stated that
he had killed two people, including a policeman, and buried them in the very
woods in which the victims' bodies were later found.81 The Georgia Supreme
Court held that the evidence against Gray did not directly connect him with the
corpus deliciti of the crime and was simply "too threadbare to be admissible. 82
Still other direct connection states require that the defendant present a "train of
fact or circumstances, as tend clearly to point out someone other than the accused
as the guilty party.",83 For example, in Alabama, William Hall admitted that he had
participated with a third party, Wayne Travis, in the burglary of a home where the
victim was later found dead from a gunshot wound.84 Hall maintained, however,
that he did not participate in the killing and that he did not know that Travis
intended to kill the victim.85 Hall sought to introduce evidence that Travis had
previously been arrested for burglaries in the area, where he had lived most of his
life, that Travis had a history of escalating crimes against people in his hometown,
and that Travis told a fellow inmate before the murder occurred that he intended to
kill an unnamed woman he disliked in the victim's part of town.8 6 The Supreme
Court of Alabama held exclusion of this evidence was proper because it was not
inconsistent with Hall's guilt since Hall admitted to being present during the
87
crime.A second group of state courts, as well as federal courts, admit evidence of third
78. In addition to their standards for establishing a "direct link," these states may also sometimes refer to a
relevancy standard. Their definition of "relevant," however, is much more stringent than the relevancy standard
under FED. R. EviD. 401. See, e.g., Watts v. State, 584 S.E.2d 740, 745 (N.C. 2003) ("Admission of the evidence
must do more than create mere conjecture of another's guilt in order to be relevant. Such evidence must (1) point
directly to the guilt of some specific person, and (2) be inconsistent with the defendant's guilt.").
79. See, e.g., State v. Rabelliza, 903 P.2d 43, 46-47 (Haw. 1995); State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 602-03
(Minn. 2004); State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881, 918-22 (Wis. 2003), vacated and remanded on other grounds by
542 U.S. 952 (2004).
80. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 604 S.E.2d 804, 812 (Ga. 2004); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo.
1998).
81. See Watson, 604 S.E.2d at 812.
82. Id. at 812.
83. State v. Caviness, 235 P. 890, 892 (Idaho 1920).
84. See Hall v. State, 820 So.2d 152, 156 (Ala. 2001).
85. Id. at 155.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 157.
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party guilt if it is relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401,88 or its state
equivalent, and not excluded by other rules of evidence, such as 403.89 We will
refer to this approach as the 401/403 approach. The small number of scholars who
have previously addressed the issue of third party guilt evidentiary restrictions
have lauded the 401/403 approach as the better test, calling it more flexible and
criticizing the varying methods of the direct connection test's application. 90
Several state courts have recently abandoned a direct connection type test in favor
of the 401/403 standard, claiming the language of the direct connection test is
unhelpful, unclear, and improperly focused on the culpability of the third party
rather than on the defendant's guilt or innocence: 91
[W]e find the use of the phrase "inherent tendency" unhelpful and agree ...
[that the] language is unclear to a fault: for one thing, a "tendency" does not
"inhere"; for another, such tendency seems a matter of weight and credibility
of evidence. Whatever its meaning, this rule forces a defendant to prove to a
judge's satisfaction that another person "really" committed the crime or was
"largely" connected to it. The proper focus in determining relevancy is the
effect the evidence has upon the defendant's culpability. To be relevant, the
evidence need only tend to create a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's
guilt.
92
The Supreme Court of Idaho dispensed with its direct connection test, calling it
"merely a specialized application of the requirement, now embodied in Idaho Rule
of Evidence 403, that a trial court balance the probative value of evidence against
countervailing considerations, such as confusion of the issues, undue delay, or
waste of time."93
88. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 reads, "'[relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
89. In addition to federal courts, the following jurisdictions use the majority approach: Arizona, California, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Texas.
90. See Powell, supra note 77, at 1056-57 (calling for "a renunciation of the 'legitimate tendency' standard and
for a uniform application of Rule 403"); Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie from the Cookie Jar?: The
Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FoDHAM L. REv. 1643, 1693 (2000) (quoting Donald A.
Drips, Relevant but Prejudicial Exculpatory Evidence: Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a
Defense, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1389, 1421 (1996)) (arguing that third party guilt evidence should be admitted if
relevant, unless the trial court finds "that the jury's consideration of the proffered evidence would make an
irrational acquittal substantially more likely than a rational acquittal").
91. See State v. Kerchusky, 67 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting the direct connection test and
embracing the 401/403 standard); see also State v. Gibson, 44 P.3d 1001, 1004 (Ariz. 2002) (reaching the same
result); People v. Primo, 753 N.E.2d 164, 167 (N.Y 2001) (coming to the same result).
92. Gibson, 44 P.3d at 1004 (citations omitted).
93. Kerchusky, 67 P.3d at 1286 (citing David McCord, But Perry Mason Made it Look So Easy!: The
Admissibility of Evidence Offered by a Criminal Defendant to Suggest that Someone Else Is Guilty, 63 TENN. L.
Rev. 917, 975 (1996)).
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In practice, however, the 401/403 approach operates in much the same way as
the direct connection test. Although the majority approach initially admits most
evidence in step one as relevant, the evidence is subject to exclusion in step two if,
in the court's discretion, the probative value of the third party guilt evidence is
thought to be outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, misleading
the jury, or waste of time.9 4 Thus, in making the probative/prejudice calculus, a
court will often require the defendant to offer evidence directly connecting the
third party to the crime before admitting any evidence of third party guilt. 95
Similarly,
phrases like "clear link" [and direct connection] are usually shorthand for
weighing probative value against prejudice in the context of third-party
culpability evidence: if there is some "clear link" or "direct connection"
between the third-party evidence and the charged crime, courts generally
conclude that it is of sufficient probative value to be admissible.
96
Thus, regardless of whether a jurisdiction adopts a direct connection test or a
94. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
95. See People v. Yeoman, 72 P.3d 1166, 1204 (Cal. 2003) (noting that "[t]o be admissible, the third-party
evidence.., need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt," but ultimately concluding
that "evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not
suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence
linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime" (quoting People v. Hall, 718 P.2d 99, 99 (Cal.
1986))); People v. Nitz, 820 N.E.2d 536, 545 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), aff'd in part and rev'd in part by People v. Nitz
848 N.E.2d 982 (Ill. 2006).
A defendant may attempt to prove that someone else committed the crime for which he is charged,
but that right is not without limitation. Such evidence is relevant and admissible only if a close
connection can be demonstrated between someone else and the commission of the offense. There
must be some evidence from which to reasonably infer that a specific individual other than the
defendant might have committed the crime. Extraneous conduct not connected with the crime
itself may not be shown.
Id. (citations omitted); State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 977, 977-79 (N.J. 1988) (noting, initially, that "'[a]
defendant of course may seek to prove that another agency produced the death with which he is charged. It would
seem in principle to be sufficient if the proof offered has a rational tendency to engender a reasonable doubt with
respect to an essential feature of the State's case,"' but ultimately concluding that "[iln the instant case.... the
proffered testimony did not draw a sufficient link between [the third party] and the victim .... (quoting State v.
Sturdivant, 155 A.2d 771, 778 (N.J. 1959))); Patterson v. State, 96 S.w.3d 427, 434-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(determining that, where the defendant was charged with sexual assault, evidence of a third party's semen on a
blanket belonging to the alleged victim found at the crime scene was relevant, but that "the relevance of the
evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion since it cannot be determined when the
semen was placed there, by whom it was placed, when-even on whose blanket it was placed, whether it was even
on the alleged victim's bed"). Although most jurisdictions seem to require some kind of direct link, train of fact, or
clear connection, there is disagreement over what, exactly, constitutes a direct link. Most majority states and some
direct link states define a direct link as one creating a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
with which he is charged. See, e.g., Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 588 (Alaska 1999). Other courts focus on
whether the evidence sufficiently implicates the third party. See, e.g., State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 848 (Mo.
1998); Elliot v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 270, 287 (Va. 2004); State v. Maupin, 913 P.2d 808, 813 (Wash.
1996).
96. Prima, 753 N.E.2d at 168 (citations omitted).
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401/403 test, its courts often use aspects of both standards when applying the law
to the specific facts of a case. For example, in Dickens v. State, the Indiana
Supreme Court claimed its standard for the admissibility of third party guilt
evidence was one of relevance: "Evidence which tends to show that someone else
committed the crime makes it less probable that the defendant committed the crime
and is therefore relevant under Rule 401. 9  Yet, when Dickens was precluded
from offering evidence that a third party, Shawn Bailey, was present during the
shooting for which Dickens was charged and that the police initially considered
Bailey a suspect, the court held that the trial judge was "warranted in concluding
that these facts do not make it less probable that Dickens committed the crime,"
and therefore, properly excluded the evidence where Dickens failed to first present
direct evidence of Bailey's guilt.98 Conversely, although the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals identifies its test as a 401/403 balancing test, it has added an
additional element-that the defendant "still must show that his proffered evi-
dence regarding the alleged alternative perpetrator is sufficient, on its own or in
combination with other evidence in the record, to show a nexus between the crime
charged and the alleged 'alternative perpetrator.' 99 This additional hurdle, the
court explained, is designed to address "the special problems presented by
alternative perpetrator evidence."'°°
Traditionally, courts have insisted that special restrictions on third party guilt
evidence are necessary for two basic reasons: (1) to prevent juror confusion; and
(2) to guard against fabricated statements by third parties.1l 1 Many courts have
argued that the admission of third party guilt evidence would cause the trial to
degenerate into confusing mini-trials of collateral issues related to the third party
and divert the jury's attention from the case at hand. 102 Courts also have expressed
97. Dickens v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 2001).
98. Id.
99. Wiley v. State, 74 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
100. Id.
101. See State v. Fletcher, 33 P. 575, 577 (Or. 1893) (noting a previous case where,
[e]ven if this letter [written by a third party] could be regarded as a confession... that [he]
committed the murder, it was only the declaration of a third party-merely hearsay testimony-
and upon no rule of evidence admissible. If such declarations were competent upon any trial for
homicide, they would tend clearly to confuse the jury, and to divert their attention from the real
issue);
see also Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11, 23 (1880) ("To allow the introduction of [third party guilt evidence]
would effect a dangerous innovation upon the law of evidence in criminal cases, and open the door to the most
fraudulent contrivances to procure the acquittal of parties accused of crime.").
102. See Smithart v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 586-587 (Alaska 1999) (stating that if evidence of third party guilt
were admissible, "'it might easily be possible for the defendant to produce evidence tending to show that
hundreds of other persons' were possible suspects in the murder. In such a system, the resulting trial would be a
confusing waste of judicial resources"); State v. Larsen, 415 P.2d 685, 692 (Idaho 1966) (stating that the court is
not prepared to hold, however, that a bare, out-of-court confession is nevertheless admissible. To
do so might have a serious injurious effect on the administration of criminal law for it would open
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concern that admission of third party guilt evidence would "open the door to the
most fraudulent contrivances to procure the acquittal of parties accused of
crime."' 0 3 These concerns can fairly be summed up as a general fear of erroneous
acquittals.
There are a number of reasons why such a fear is unfounded, or at least,
over-emphasized. °4 First, a focus on this issue ignores the high value our system
places on avoiding convictions of the innocent. The presumption of innocence and
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in our system "reflect[] an explicit
preference for allowing some guilty people to go free in order to ensure that
innocent defendants are not convicted."' 0 5 Second, to the extent a fear of
erroneous acquittal is based on the assumption that a defendant could freely offer
false testimony with impunity, this fear is also misplaced. It is up to the prosecution
to make its case, "and in doing so must disprove the defendant's claim of
innocence, regardless of what form it may take." 10 6 Moreover, the prosecution is
not without methods for exposing untruthful testimony, including investigation,
cross-examination, and perjury charges for those who offer untruthful testi-
mony.10 7 Finally, social science research suggests that such concerns are unwar-
ranted or exaggerated because jurors are not so easily duped as this fear sug-
gests.' 0 8 As we will explain in much greater detail in Part II, jurors are actively
engaged throughout the trial process and are generally capable of separating a
the door to defendants to produce perjured and fraudulent "confessions" by others who, for some
unexplained reason, have "disappeared" or are otherwise "unavailable" as witnesses);
State v. Wilson, 406 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Iowa 1987) (holding that, if the defendant had been permitted to introduce
evidence of third party guilt, "this trial rapidly could have disintegrated into two trials"); State v. Dechaine, 572
A.2d 130, 134 n.9 (Maine 1990) (holding that, had the defendant been allowed to pursue an alternative perpetrator
theory, "the trial of [the defendant] would have turned into the trial of [the third party]," and that "[t]he admission
of that evidence would have resulted in 'confusion of the issues.... misleading the jury[,] ... undue delay [and]
waste of time"'); Fletcher, 33 P. at 577 (holding that third party guilt evidence would confuse and divert the jury's
attention); Oliva v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 877, 880 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that evidence of third party
guilt might confuse or mislead the jury); State v. Denny, 357 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that the
restriction on third party guilt evidence "is designed to place reasonable limits on the trial of collateral
issues.. . and to avoid undue prejudice to the People from unsupported jury speculation as to the guilt of other
suspects").
103. Munshower, 55 Md. at 23.
104. See Dripps, supra note 90, at 1402-07 (discussing the countervailing factors, such as protection of the
innocent and the defendant's right to present a defense, which must be considered along with the risk of
prejudice).
105. Suni, supra note 90, at 1687.
106. Powell, supra note 77, at 1050.
107. Id. Powell also suggests that if these safeguards are not sufficient, increased penalties for perjury and a
lowered burden of proof in perjury cases could achieve the same protection without infringing on a defendant's
due process guarantees.
108. See, e.g., Richard Lempert, The Jury's Role in Administering Justice in the United States: Narrative
Relevance, Imagined Juries, and a Supreme Court Inspired Agenda for Jury Research, 21 ST. LoUIs U. PuB. L.
Rev. 15, 18 (2002) (arguing that jurors are not "easily biased or confused," but instead are "active, curious, and
intelligent processor[s] of information").
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plausible story from an implausible one. Courts therefore do not need heavy
restrictions on third party guilt evidence to prevent jurors from scurrying after
speculation about an alternative perpetrator when there is no evidence to support
such a theory.
More importantly for our purposes here, however, is that evidentiary restrictions
based on these concerns fail to consider the role third party guilt evidence (or lack
thereof) plays in shaping the narrative, or story, that the defendant will present to
the jury in his defense. Empirical studies have shown that-more than legal
standards, definitions or instructions-narrative plays a key role in the juror
decision-making process."19 Without a thorough understanding and consideration
of the narrative relevance of third party guilt evidence, restrictions on its use
cannot be, and are not being, appropriately applied because they fail to account for
the way in which jurors actually think and process information at trial.
A brief survey of recent third party guilt evidence cases throughout the country
reveals that, generally, reported third party guilt cases tend to fall on the fringes. In
other words, criminal defendants appear to be mostly offering either very strong
cases of third party guilt, or evidence so speculative of a third party's involvement
that the suggestion of an alternative perpetrator seems ridiculous. 110 Our review of
the cases also reveals that, in these instances on the fringes, courts are usually
getting it right-i.e., overturning exclusions in the very strong cases and upholding
109. See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCrING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM:
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of
Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOzo L. REv. 519 (1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, A
Cognitive Theory].
110. See, e.g., Birmingham v. State, 27 S.W.3d 351, 359-60 (Ark. 2000) (holding that evidence of other rapes
while the defendant was in jail was too speculative); People v. Yeoman, 72 P.3d 1166, 1203-1204 (Cal. 2003)
(holding that the defendant's offering of three possible alternative killers was properly held inadmissible); State v.
Francis, 836 A.2d 1191, 1199-1200 (Conn. 2003) (holding that the trial court properly refused to disclose a third
party's alcohol treatment records on the grounds that the possibility that this person killed the victim because of
alcohol abuse was too attenuated); People v. Kirchner, 743 N.E.2d 94, 113-14 (Ill. 2000) (holding that evidence
that a third party possessed the murder weapon weeks prior to the killing was properly excluded); State v. Wilson,
406 N.W.2d 442, 447-48 (Iowa 1987) (holding that evidence of the victim's sexual preferences was not relevant as
a reason that a third party may have killed him); State v. Holterman, 687 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Or. App. 1984)
("Rumors, circumstances, and [victim's) fears are not probative of much at all."); State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974,
1003-04 (N.J. 2004) (holding that the defendant's evidence of the victim's drug dealing had no connection with
her death and was too attenuated); State v. Malick, 457 S.E.2d 482,485 (W.V. 1995) (upholding the exclusion of
the sexual assault on the victim by a third party where the defendant admitted he was the only person with the
victim at the time of the assault with which he was charged); see also McCord, supra note 85, at 938 (finding that
"courts across the country arrive at fairly standard and predictable results"); cf State v. Prion, 52 P.3d 189, 193-94
(Ariz. 2002) (holding that the trial court erred in not admitting a litany of evidence regarding a third party who had
contact with the victim); Joyner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind. 1997) (finding that the trial court erred in
precluding the defendant from offering evidence connecting a third party to the crime, including a hair sample
retrieved from the garbage bag over the victim's head which excluded the defendant as the source of the hair and
implicated the third party. The defendant also proffered testimony to establish motive (the third party's argument
with the victim) and opportunity (the third party's unexplained absence and subsequent cover up of being late to
work)).
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them in the very weak cases."1' It is in the rarer middle cases, however, that we
think some courts are failing to strike the right balance-and where neither the
401/403 nor the direct connection test, however it is articulated, can guarantee
protection of a criminal defendant's constitutional right to present a complete
defense. A better grasp of the narrative relevance of third party guilt evidence will
provide the proper context for courts to evaluate both the probative value and any
prejudicial impact such evidence carries. Thinking of third party evidence issues in
these terms will help courts get it right more often in the middle cases and provide
a rational explanation to support courts' generally correct decisions in the fringe
cases.
II. NARRATvE RELEVANCE
For more than twenty years, researchers of juror decision-making have recog-
nized the importance of story. Often referred to as "the story model,"' 1 2 "holistic
reasoning,' 13 or "narrative theory,"' 14 these models reflect a broad "shift away
from positivism, neutrality, and objectivism as the dominant standards for legal
scholarship and decision-making"' 15 and an adoption of the notion that "human
11. See, e.g., Prion, 52 P.3d at 193-94 (granting the defendant a new trial where he was precluded from
offering evidence that a third party had a motive, opportunity, and propensity to commit the crime with which he
was charged); Kirchner, 743 N.E.2d at 114 (upholding the exclusion of evidence that a third party had access to
the murder weapon one month before the crime occurred, but where it was undisputed that the defendant
possessed the weapon immediately prior to and after the crime); Joyner, 678 N.E.2d at 389-90 (overturning the
trial court's exclusion of third party guilt evidence including motive, opportunity and the fact that a hair recovered
at the crime scene bore similar characteristics to the third party's hair); Malick, 457 S.E.2d at 485 (upholding the
exclusion of evidence that a third party had sexually assaulted the same victim in the same month, but where the
defendant conceded that he was the only person present with the victim at the time of the assault with which he
was charged).
112. See generally Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 109 (describing the story model).
113. See generally Peter Brooks, Narrativity of the Law, 14 L. & LITERATuRE 1 (2002) (describing narrative
relevance in terms of holistic reasoning); Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18
VT. L. REv. 681 (1994) [hereinafter Sherwin, Narrative Construction] (discussing holistic reasoning).
114. See generally John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative Theory: A Proposal for Reform,
53 DRAKE L. REV. 599 (2005) (discussing narrative theory).
115. Sherwin, Narrative Construction, supra note 113, at 717. Narrative theory rejects the previous line of
thinking in which juror reasoning was generally thought to follow some sort of mathematical model, such as
Bayesian theory, traditional probability theory, or other algebraic models. See generally L. JONATHAN COHEN, THE
PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE (1977) (describing mathematical models of legal reasoning); GLENN SHAFER, A
MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE (1976) (describing the different mathematical models); Stephen E.
Fienberg & Mark J. Schervich, The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the Presentation of Evidence and for
Legal Decision Making, 66 B.U. L. REv. 771 (1986) (describing the application of Bayesian Theory to legal
decision making); Martin F Kaplan, Cognitive Processes in the Individual Juror, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE
COURTROOM 197 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982) (discussing the different mathematical theories).
These previously accepted mathematical models posited that jurors reasoned in a strictly linear fashion by
evaluating the strength of each piece of evidence individually and then entering that strength into a final calculus
to reach an ultimate conclusion. See generally Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in
Legal Decision Making, 71 U. Cat. L. REV. 511, 511-13 (2004) (explaining the rationalist view that legal decision
making strictly follows logical paths of inference).
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perception and cognition are never without some interpretive framework within
which reality and meaning come into view."' 1 6 That interpretive framework,
according to narrative theory, is typically some form of story structure." 7
It is now widely accepted, and empirical research demonstrates, that narrative
plays an important role throughout the entire trial process.'1 8 First, jurors organize
and interpret trial evidence as they receive it by placing it into a story format:
[T]rials are often fragmented affairs in which evidence comes in a piece at a
time, often without any deference to logical order, and at times consists of
extensive evidentiary foundations which are unrelated to the substance of the
case. Jurors make sense of this by constantly trying to fit the information they
are hearing into a story. 119
In one of the most extensive studies on jury decision making, Lance Bennett and
Martha Feldman found that jurors judged disputed versions in criminal trials by
reducing them to story format because the story is their most common everyday
communicational form.120 Stories provide useful structures: plot, characters, time
frames, motives, and settings, which help jurors process and understand what is
otherwise complex and sometimes unfamiliar information. 121
The story structure also helps jurors solve the problem of information overload
in trials by making it possible to continuously organize and reorganize large
amounts of constantly changing evidence. 122 Trials are by nature filled with
ambiguities; jurors seek to resolve this uncertainty because it is uncomfortable and
a barrier to decisive action. 123 Simplification of the evidence into a sensible trial
story is necessary to enable jurors to make a decision at all: "Psychologically, we
crave meaning. Meaning lends order and control. Chaos is disorienting and
unpleasant, especially in matters of life and death.... Without coherent stories,
116. Sherwin, Narrative Construction, supra note 113, at 717.
117. Legal scholars of critical race theory and feminist theory have long been discussing and employing the
power of storytelling. See, e.g., Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Essay on Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 2128, 2132-37 (1989) (using story to explain "the truth about equality"). See generally Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971 (1991) (examining the emergence of feminist narrative
scholarship); Gerald P. Lopez, Keynote Address, Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2041
(2005) (using story to explain the need for creative methods of solving community problems).
118. See generally BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 109 (describing the role of narrative at trial); Nancy
Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 242 (1986); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Jury Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 189 (1992); Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive
Theory, supra note 109.
119. Mitchell, supra note 114, at 612.
120. BENNETr & FELDMAN, supra note 109, at 164-68.
121. SuNwoLF, PRAcrIcAL JuRY DYNAMICS 271 (2004).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 283, 287.
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judgment becomes impossible."1 24
Second, trials are essentially "story-battle[s]." In the courtroom, each attorney
will tell the jury a different story, present evidence to support that story, and make
arguments for why the jury should accept their particular story as "truth. '1 25 The
stories may disagree on plot (what actually happened), they may disagree on
motive of central characters (why it happened) or they may disagree on what the
consequences of the events should be (what would constitute justice).1 26 The
jurors then compare their own stories with those offered by the parties. The side
who can offer a story which the juror accepts as the "best" explanation of the
evidence presented, and the closest match to his or her own narrative, will win the
juror's vote in the end. 127
Third, jurors essentially "re-story" evidence during deliberations. Professor
Sunwolf studied videotaped deliberations from four criminal trials and found that
jurors primarily argued with one another during deliberations in story format. 28 At
the opening of deliberations in one criminal trial, the foreman began by stating, "I
don't know, I'd kind of like to make a story. Then have everybody believe the same
story that happened."' 129 The jurors deliberated in story form by including not only
the actual evidence offered at trial, but imported their own real-life experiences as
well as fictionalized trial evidence by engaging in imaginative storytelling. 
130
The research of Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, conducted during mock
criminal trials, confirms that jurors construct their stories from three general types
of knowledge: (1) case-specific information acquired at trial, (2) the juror's own
background knowledge and experiences, and (3) the juror's expectations about
what makes a complete story. 1 31 These categories parallel the findings of cognitive
psychologists who believe that we give meaning to our experience by placing it
into cognitive frames called "schema" or "scripts." These are defined as:
[T]he mental blueprints that we carry around in our head for quick assessments
of what we may or should be seeing or feeling in a given situation. Such
blueprints are simplified models of experiences we have had before. They
represent a kind of shorthand that transcribes our stored knowledge of the
world, describing kinds of situations, problems, and personalities. These
models allow us to economize on mental energy: we need not interpret things
124. Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 39, 71 (1994).
125. SUNWOLF, supra note 121, at 272.
126. Id.
127. Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 109, at 522-23.
128. See SuwoLF, supra note 121, at 272-80.
129. Id. at 271.
130. Id. at 269.
131. Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 109, at 522.
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afresh when there are pre-existing categories that cover the experience or
condition in question.-1
32
For example, Charles Nuckolls illustrates how decision makers draw on schemas
to fill in missing information with the following two sentences: "John went to a
party. The next morning he woke up with a headache."' 33 It is common knowledge
that people who go to parties often drink too much and wake up the next morning
with a hangover. The point is that the causal explanation "goes considerably
beyond the information given."' 134 Jurors use schemas and scripts to make
inferences from what they know to what they do not know.'
35
The party who can tell the most compelling story, which fits best with each
individual juror's own narrative (as constructed from the trial evidence, back-
ground information including schemas and scripts, and expectations), will emerge
the ultimate winner in the case. There are several factors that determine whether a
particular story will be accepted as true. Pennington and Hastie group these factors
into two "certainty principles" called "coverage" and "coherence."'' 36 Coverage
refers to the extent to which the story accounts for the evidence presented at trial.
"[T]he greater the story's coverage, the more acceptable the story as an explana-
tion of the evidence, and the greater confidence the juror will have in the story as
an explanation ....,,137 An explanation that leaves much of the evidence unac-
counted for is likely to be rejected. Coherence has three related sub-components-
consistency, plausibility and completeness. 138 A story is consistent when it does
not contain internal contradictions either with other evidence in the case, or with
other parts of the explanation. 139 A story is plausible if it corresponds with the
juror's general "knowledge about what typically happens in the world."' 40 Finally,
a story is complete when the "structure of the story has all of its parts."' 4 1 "Missing
information, or lack of plausible inferences about one or more major components
of the story.., will decrease confidence in the explanation."'
' 42
132. Sherwin, Narrative Construction, supra note 113, at 700.
133. Charles W. Nuckolls, Culture and Causal Thinking: Diagnosis and Prediction in a South Indian Fishing
Village, 19 ETHOS 3, 4 (1991).
134. Id. at 5.
135. Cognitive psychologists recognize a related phenomenon, which they refer to as "gist memory." See
generally C.J. BRAINERD & V.F. REYNA, THE Sc ENCE OF FALSE MEMORY (2005). A person may have a memory of
specific details, or she may remember only an event as a whole. Id. at 5. Gist memory is very susceptible to
incorporating gist-consistent details when they are suggested because they complete the story. Id. at 161-66.
136. Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 109, at 527 (1991).
137. Id. at 528.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 528. Significant gaps in the expected line of a story can be particularly detrimental to a story's
coverage and coherence. The research of Dan Simon suggests that the missing information, or lack of plausible
explanation for a particular piece of the story, can affect the way in which jurors view other, logically unrelated
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Thus because human beings are essentially "homo narrens,"1 4 3 storytelling is an
indispensable tool for lawyers representing defendants in criminal cases. That is
why criminal defendants try to tell them. The defendant's ability to tell the right
story-and to tell it completely-is a powerful influence on the outcome of a trial
and thus central to the protection of his constitutional right to present a complete
defense.
III. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE
In 1967 the United States Supreme Court decided Washington v. Texas. 44 The
rule at issue in Washington, formerly in wide acceptance under the common law
and in federal courts, prohibited accomplices from testifying for one another
(although the State was free to use an accomplice's testimony against the
accused).145 As a result, when Washington was tried for murder, he was prevented
from calling as a witness a third party named Fuller who was willing to confess to
the same crime.146 Fuller was the only other eyewitness to the events of the crime
and there was some evidence in corroboration of his guilt. Washington was
convicted and sentenced to fifty years in prison. 147 In overturning his conviction,
the Supreme Court stated that the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause
guaranteed a criminal defendant the right to present a defense:
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance, if
necessary, is in plain terms the right to present the defense, the right to present
the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the
prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has
the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. 1 48
The Texas rule on accomplice testimony was invalid, the Court held, because it
arbitrarily denied Washington "the right to put on the stand a witness.., whose
items of evidence. For example, Simon found that mock jurors who had previously rated such items of evidence
as the veracity of an eyewitness's testimony and their beliefs about the accuracy of eyewitness identification in
general as moderately strong in a criminal trial, lowered these ratings after the introduction of DNA evidence
suggested that the particular testifying eyewitness was incorrect about her identification. In other words, jurors
tend to shift their view of individual elements in a story to cohere with their ultimate decision; "sufficiently strong
pieces of evidence [or lack thereof] can affect the entire mental model of the case through indirect influences on
other variables." Simon, supra note 115, at 567.
143. "Man is eminently a storyteller. His search for a purpose, a cause, an ideal, a mission and the like is
largely a search for plot and a pattern in the development of his life story." Eiuc HOFFER, THE PASSIONATE STATE
OF MIND AND OTHER APHORISMS 59 (1955).
144. 338 U.S. 14 (1967).
145. Id. at 16-17 & n.4.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id. at 17.
148. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense." 149 The State
argued that the rule was necessary to prevent perjury by the accomplices-each
attempting to swear the other out of the charge, but the Court rejected this reason,
stating that it was not a compelling interest:
[It is] the conviction of our time that the truth is more likely to be arrived at by
hearing the testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may
seem to have knowledge about the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit
and weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury or by the court. 150
Following its decision in Washington, the Court decided a number of cases
under the broad doctrine of "the right to present a defense"-although it was not
always consistent or clear about the right's origins. In Chambers v. Mississippi, the
Court held that the defendant was denied "a [fair] trial in accord with traditional
and fundamental standards of due process" when application of Mississippi's
voucher and hearsay rules prevented Chambers from thoroughly cross examining
and presenting prior inconsistent statements against a third party who had
confessed to the murder for which Chambers was charged. 151 The Court's opinion
intertwined Sixth Amendment and due process principles:
The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. The rights to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in one's own
behalf have long been recognized as essential to due process.'
52
The Court also invalidated Arkansas's categorical prohibition on hypnotically
refreshed testimony, holding that the rule violated a defendant's right to present a
defense. 153 The defendant in Rock v. Arkansas was accused of a killing to which
she was the only eyewitness. She alleged that she was able to remember the facts
of the killing only after having her memory hypnotically refreshed. Because
Arkansas excluded all hypnotically refreshed testimony, the defendant was unable
to testify about certain relevant facts, including whether the killing had been
accidental. 154 The Court held the rule unconstitutional because "[w]holesale
inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an arbitrary restriction on the right to
testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all
posthypnosis recollections."155
149. Id. at 23.
150. Id. at 22.
151. 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973).
152. Id. at 294.
153. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 57 (1987).
154. Id. at 47-49.
155. Id. at 61; cf United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (holding that exclusion of the defendant's
polygraph evidence did not violate his right to present a defense where the evidence was not factual and merely
served to bolster the defendant's credibility).
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Thus, "[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment... or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the
Sixth Amendment... the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaning-
ful opportunity to present a complete defense.' ' 156 The affirmative aspects of this
right remain unclear, but the Court has at least explained that it is "abridged by
evidence rules that 'infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are
"'arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purpose they are designed to serve .... 157 In
the context of third party guilt evidentiary restrictions, prior to Holmes, the Court
had decided only one other case-Chambers v. Mississippi158-the facts of which
parallel in many respects the facts of Holmes.
A. Chambers v. Mississippi
Chambers was arrested for the murder of a local police officer, Aaron Liberty. 159
Liberty was shot and killed by the bullet of a .22 caliber pistol after a crowd of
angry onlookers attacked a group of Woodville, Mississippi policemen while they
attempted to execute a warrant for the arrest of a resistant youth outside a bar.
160
Chambers was also shot during the incident. Three friends brought the wounded
Chambers to a nearby hospital. 16 1 When police learned that Chambers had
survived the shooting, he was arrested and charged with the murder of Officer
Liberty. 162
One of Chambers's three friends that night was a man named Gable McDonald.
Several days after the shooting, McDonald gave a sworn and voluntary confession
to Chambers's attorneys that he-not Leon Chambers-had shot Officer Lib-
erty. 16 3 One month later, at Chambers's preliminary hearing, McDonald repudiated
his sworn confession and testified that he had not even been at the scene of the
shooting.1 64 Instead, he claimed that he and Berkley Turner were having drinks in
a nearby caf6 when they heard the shots.
165
At trial, Chambers tried to introduce evidence showing that McDonald had
actually committed the crime. 166 Chambers called McDonald to the stand and
successfully introduced McDonald's prior out-of-court confession into evi-
156. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485
(1984)).
157. Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 1731 (quoting Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308 (quoting Rock, 483
U.S. at 58)).
158. 410 U.S. 283 (1973).
159. Id. at 287.
160. Id. at 285-86.
161. See id. at 287.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 288.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 289.
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dence. 167 On cross-examination by the State, McDonald testified that he had
repudiated this confession. 168 Chambers then tried to challenge McDonald's
renunciation, but was prevented from doing so when the trial court applied
Mississippi's "voucher rule," which prevented a party from impeaching his own
witness. 1
69
Unable to directly challenge McDonald's renunciation of his prior confession,
Chambers sought to introduce the testimony of three other witnesses to whom
McDonald had confessed. 170 After testifying that neither he nor McDonald had
been in the nearby caf6 at the time of the shooting as McDonald had claimed,
Berkley Turner would have told the jury that McDonald had confessed that he was
Liberty's killer and had urged Turner not to "mess him up. ' 171 Sam Hardin and
Albert Carter would also have testified to similar confessions McDonald made to
them. 172 But the jury heard nothing about McDonald's confessions to these men.
His statements were excluded under Mississippi's hearsay rules. 173 Chambers was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.
1 74
The Supreme Court reversed Chambers's conviction and held that the trial
court's application of Mississippi's voucher and hearsay rules, resulting in an
exclusion of third party guilt evidence, deprived Chambers of due process of law
because it significantly undermined fundamental elements of his defense. 75 The
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants "a meaningful opportunity to present
a complete defense."' 176 This right, the Court held, is among the most fundamental
to our system of ordered liberty. 177 The Court acknowledged that, as a general rule,
the accused, in exercising his right to present a complete defense, "must comply
with [states'] established rules of procedure and evidence."1 78 But, "where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated,"
those rules "may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."'179
The Court made a point to announce that its decision in Chambers was not an
establishment of any new principle of constitutional law.' 80 Nor did the Court
intend its holding to "signal any diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to
167. Id. at 291.
168. Id.
169. See id. at 291-92.
170. Id. at 292.
171. Id.
172. See id. at 292-93.
173. See id. at 293-94.
174. Id. at 285.
175. Id. at 302.
176. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485
(1984)).
177. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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the States in the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial rules
and procedures. 1 8' Rather, the Court stated that its holding was simply "that under
the facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived
Chambers of a fair trial."
1 82
The parameters of Chambers's holding remained unclear. Despite the Supreme
Court's disclaimer of any new rule of law, legal commentators consistently
referred to it as establishing a generally applicable principle of the right to present
a complete defense.1"3 There was much disagreement, however, on the specific
contours of that right. Professor Churchwell noted the development of the
"Chambers rule" requiring that:
The minimal evidentiary criteria which must be met before any declaration can
be considered as rising to constitutional stature are these: (1) the declarant's
testimony is otherwise unavailable; (2) the declaration is an admission of an
unlawful act; (3) the declaration is inherently inconsistent with the guilt of the
accused; and (4) there are such corroborating facts and circumstances surround-
ing the making of the declaration as to clearly indicate that it has a high
probability of trustworthiness. 184
Professor Nagareda characterized Chambers as establishing that "the accused in a
criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to introduce any exculpatory
evidence, unless the State can demonstrate that it is so inherently unreliable as to
leave the trier of fact with no rational basis for evaluating its truth. 1 85 Similarly,
Professor Westen suggested that Chambers established a criminal defendant's
"constitutional right to introduce exculpatory evidence at trial if it possesses
sufficient 'assurances of reliability to be capable of rational evaluation by a
properly instructed jury.' ' ' 18 6 Professor Clinton argued that the defendant's evi-
dence should be evaluated by a "totality of the circumstances" approach in light of
its importance in the defendant's overall case. 
187
Even the Court itself seemed confused about Chambers's implications. Al-
though the Chambers opinion made a point to state that its holding was strictly
limited to the facts of the case, the Court later treated Chambers as establishing a
181. Id. at 302-03.
182. Id. at 303.
183. See, e.g, Steven G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right to Present Evidence: Progeny of Chambers v.
Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 131, 137-45 (1983); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711, 800-01 (1976); Richard A. Nagareda,
Reconceiving the Right to Present Witnesses, 97 McH. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (1999); Peter Westen, Compulsory
Process 1, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 151-52 (1974).
184. Churchwell, supra note 183, at 138 (quoting State v. Gardener, 534 P.2d 140, 142 (Wash. App. 1975)).
185. Nagareda, supra note 183, at 1084.
186. Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases,
91 HARv. L. REV. 567, 627 n.167 (1977).
187. Clinton, supra note 183, at 800.
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generally applicable rule of law. 188 At other times, however, the Court reverted
back to treating Chambers as nothing more than "an exercise in highly case-
specific error correction."' 89 Justice O'Connor, however, was critical of attempts
to limit Chambers's holding:
The plurality's characterization of Chambers as 'case-specific error correction'
cannot diminish its force as a prohibition on enforcement of state evidentiary
rules that lead, without sufficient justification, to the establishment of guilt by
suppression of evidence supporting the defendant's case. 190
The Court's mixed signals left the lower courts without the guidance necessary to
appropriately evaluate the constitutionality of state evidentiary rules governing the
admissibility of third party guilt evidence. In fact, lower courts often adjudicate the
admissibility of such evidence without reference or regard to constitutional
concerns; 9 1 instead they tend by and large to apply the jurisdiction's applicable
rule of evidence and then move on as if Chambers had never been decided.
1 92
Thus, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear Holmes v. South Carolina, it was an
opportunity to clarify the status and scope of Chambers and, more broadly, the
criminal defendant's right to present a defense.
B. Holmes v. South Carolina
In part because of the ambiguities surrounding the right to present a defense, and
in part because the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision was clearly wrong for
several reasons, there were a number of arguments advanced for why the United
States Supreme Court should hear and reverse Holmes's case. The National
188. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303,308 (1998) (citing Chambers to support the statement that the
exclusion of evidence is unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate where it "has infringed upon a weighty
interest of the accused").
189. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 52 (1996).
190. Id. at 62-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
191. The following cases rely entirely on state law regarding the admissibility of third party evidence: Smithart
v. State, 988 P.2d 583, 586 (Alaska 1999); Birmingham v. State, 27 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Ark. 2000); People v.
Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000, 1008 (Col. 1984); State v. Francis, 836 A.2d 1191, 1199 (Conn. 2003); State v. Wilson,
406 N.W.2d 442,447 (Iowa 1987); State v. Davidson, 982 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Mo. 1998); State v. Wright, 817 A.2d
600, 609 (R.I. 2003); State v. Luna, 378 N.W.2d 229, 232 (S.D. 1985).
192. In fact, few states ever discuss Chambers beyond its broad proposition that defendants have a right to
present a complete defense. With respect to the admission of evidence of third party guilt, New Jersey is alone in
its attempt to couch the issue as ultimately a matter of the Chambers due process right. See State v. Koedatich, 548
A.2d 939, 976 (N.J. 1988) ("[T]he Supreme Court [in Chambers] recognized that an accused has a constitutional
right under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to offer probative evidence tending to show that a
third party committed the crime charged."); see also State v. Reed, 753 A.2d 1247, 1248 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div.
2000) (reiterating that "'an accused has a constitutional right under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to offer probative evidence tending to show that a third party committed the crime charged"' (quoting
Keodatich, 548 A.2d at 976)); State v. Fulston, 738 A.2d 380, 384 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1999) (quoting the
Keodatich decision). In other states where Chambers was cited in third party guilt cases, the claims are often
rejected with little discussion. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 717 A.2d 1140, 1152-53 (Conn. 1998) (rejecting a
Chambers claim because the defendant did not show the third party was unavailable).
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), in its amicus brief, argued
that South Carolina's decision denied Holmes his "constitutional right to have the
jury consider the evidence that he wishes to present in support of his defense" and
to "have a jury, rather than a judge, make the ultimate determination of all
facts. ' 193 The NACDL also argued that the South Carolina standard was unconsti-
tutional because it arbitrarily discriminated against "a particular type of defense
evidence relating to the issue of whether the defendant is guilty of the crimes of
which he is accused" while "the prosecution labors under no similar, special
restrictions in seeking to present evidence to a jury supporting its allegations of a
defendant's guilt."1 94
The Innocence Project, also as amicus curiae, focused on the fact that the rule
permitted exclusion of third party guilt evidence when the prosecution's case was
"strong" without evaluating the countervailing evidence, arguing that it under-
mined the presumption of innocence and violated a defendant's right to a jury
trial. 195 The Innocence Project characterized this aspect of the rule as "constitution-
ally defective as a general matter, inherently illogical and ill-conceived as an
evidentiary matter, and is particularly unfair as applied to [Holmes], given the
plethora of evidence supporting [his] theory of fabrication and/or contamination of
the forensic evidence."' 196 An amicus brief from forty professors of evidence law
pointed out that, at the very least, the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision
should be reversed because the case was factually indistinguishable from Cham-
bers. 1
97
Holmes's own briefs argued that South Carolina's rule excluding his third party
guilt evidence violated his rights to trial by jury, to call witnesses in his defense,
and to cross-examine the state's witnesses against him.' 98 Holmes also argued that
the standard unconstitutionally reduced the prosecution's burden of proving his
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.199
In the end, however, the Supreme Court said very little about any of these
193. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
7-8, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327).
194. Id. at 12.
195. Brief for Innocence Project Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Holmes v. South Carolina,
126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327).
196. Id.
197. Brief for Forty Professors of Evidence Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, Holmes v.
South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327). In fact, the evidence professors argued that the
constitutional deprivation in Holmes was worse than that in Chambers because: (1) "Chambers was allowed to
present substantial evidence that Gable McDonald was the real killer, and to argue that defense to the jury,"
whereas Holmes was entirely precluded from making reference to Jimmy White; and (2) Chambers's third party
guilt evidence was excluded by rules that applied to "all parties in all trials," whereas the rule in Holmes was
one-sided in that it applied only to criminal defendants. Id. at 18-19.
198. Brief of Petitioner at 23-50, Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006) (No. 04-1327) [hereinafter
Petitioner's Brief].
199. Id. at 34-35.
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arguments, leaving the waters nearly as muddied as they were before Holmes was
decided. The Court began by acknowledging that "the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense"'-
neglecting to specify whether that opportunity is rooted in the due process,
compulsory process, or confrontation clause.2 00 The Court stated that its previous
decisions, including Washington, Chambers, Crane, Rock, and Scheffer, establish
that the right to present a defense "is abridged by evidence rules that 'infring[e]
upon a weighty interest of the accused' and are 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to
the purposes they are designed to serve,"' but that courts are nonetheless permitted
to employ "well-established rules of evidence ... to exclude evidence if its
probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury., 20 1
The Court acknowledged evidentiary restrictions on third party guilt evidence
designed to exclude evidence which is "'speculative or remote, or does not tend to
prove or disprove a material fact in issue at the defendant's trial"' as "widely
accepted.,202 South Carolina's Gregory standard, adopted in 1941, was such a
rule:
[Elvidence offered by the accused as to the commission of the crime by
another person must be limited to such facts as are inconsistent with his own
guilt, and to such facts as raise a reasonable presumption of his own innocence;
evidence which can have (no) other effect than to cast a bare suspicion upon
another, or raise a conjectural inference as to the commission of the crime by
another, is not admissible.... [B]efore such testimony can be received, there
must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances,
as tends clearly to point out such other person as the guilty party.20 3
In State v. Gay, however, the Court noted that South Carolina "radically changed
and extended" the Gregory rule by claiming that "'in view of the strong evidence
of [the defendant's] guilt-especially the forensic evidence-.. . the proffered
evidence.., did not raise "a reasonable inference" as to [the defendant's] own
innocence.',,204 Similarly, in Holmes's case, the Court stated that the South
Carolina Supreme Court had applied a rule that "'where there is strong evidence of
[a defendant's] guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the
proffered evidence about a third party's alleged guilt' may (or perhaps must) be
excluded."20
5
The Court honed in on the fact that South Carolina's rule, while implementing a
bar on third party guilt evidence when the State alleged forensic evidence of the
200. Holmes v. South Carolina, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 (2006).
201. Id. at 1731-32 (internal quotations omitted).
202. Id. at 1733 (quoting 40AAm.Jur.2d, Homicide § 286, pp. 136-38 (1999)).
203. State v. Gregory, 16 S.E.2d 532, 534-35 (S.C. 1941) (internal quotations omitted).
204. Holmes, 126 S.Ct. at 1734 (quoting State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541, 545 (S.C. 2001)).
205. Id. (quoting State v. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19, 24 (S.C. 2004)).
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defendant's guilt, did not call for any examination of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses or the reliability of its forensic evidence.2 °6 The Court
pointed out that the South Carolina Supreme Court had completely ignored
Holmes's arguments about the unreliability of the prosecution's forensic evidence
and yet, in evaluating the prosecution's forensic case, deemed it to be "strong,"
thereby justifying exclusion of [Holmes's] third party guilt evidence. 20 7 "The
point," the Court stated, "is that by evaluating the strength of only one party's
evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding the strength of contrary
evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast doubt., 20 8 Thus, the Court held:
Because the rule applied by the State Supreme Court in this case did not heed
this point, the rule is "arbitrary" in the sense that it does not rationally serve the
end that the Gregory rule and other similar third party guilt rules were designed
to further. Nor has the State identified any other legitimate end that the rule
serves. It follows that the rule applied in this case by the State Supreme Court
violates a criminal defendant's right to have a "meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense. 20 9
The Court's brief opinion in Holmes corrected an error, but it answered few of
the broad lingering questions about the implications of its previous decision in
Chambers. At the very least, it established that Chambers has some lasting value
beyond a mere "exercise of factually specific error correction." Although the
opinion says little about what quantum of third party guilt evidence constitutes a
"weighty interest of the accused," we know at least that Holmes had one in his
case. Finally, the opinion also provides little explanation regarding the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the right to present a defense.
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A COMPLETE DEFENSE INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO TLL A
PLAUSIBLE STORY IF THE DEFENDANT HAS ONE
The Supreme Court's decisions in Chambers and Holmes establish that, in the
context of third party guilt evidence cases, a criminal defendant has a right to
present a complete defense which cannot be arbitrarily infringed upon by state
evidentiary rules. And yet, these decisions do little to clarify precisely what the
right to present a defense actually means. What we advance here is that the right to
a fair trial before a jury and the right to present a complete defense must take
account of what we know about how criminal trials work and the way in which
their participants function.210 We have explained previously in this Article that
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1735.
209. Id. at 1734.
210. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 169-71 (1994) (acknowledging that "most juries lack
accurate information about the precise meaning of 'life imprisonment' and holding that the defendant's due
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empirically we know that jurors process the information they receive at trial by
shaping it into a story format, and thus, that a defendant's ability to tell a plausible
and complete story of his own innocence determines the jury's verdict. In other
,,211words: "Law lives on narrative. We are now increasingly coming to recognize
that both the questions and the answers in matters of "fact" depend largely upon
one's choice (considered or unconsidered) of some overall narrative as best
describing what happened or how the world works. Therefore, one essential
component of the right to present a defense should include the right to tell a
coherent story. A fair legal standard "should relate to the way people learn. ' 212
The Supreme Court has already recognized the basic principles of narrative
relevance in its decision in Old Chief v. United States.2 t3 The case arose when
Johnny Lynn Old Chief was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon, using
a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon.2 14 To prove that Old Chief was a felon in possession of a firearm,
the government sought to introduce Old Chief's criminal record, which stated that
he had previously been convicted of a felony-namely, assault which resulted in a
serious bodily injury-and sentenced to five years imprisonment.21 5 Old Chief
offered to stipulate to the fact that he was a convicted felon and thereby would
have violated the felon in possession law if the jury found that he committed the
other crimes with which he was charged. 1 6 The prosecutor rejected the stipula-
tion, arguing that he had the right to prove his case using whatever relevant
evidence he wished. The trial judge agreed, and the appellate court affirmed his
decision.217
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Souter.218 The
Court held that, given the availability of the stipulation, the probative value of the
criminal record was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.21 9
Although the details of the record would have been "technically relevant," the
Court stated that the record did not address anything "in the definition of the
prior-conviction element that would not have been covered by the stipulation or
process rights were violated when the trial court refused to instruct the jury that life, as an alternative to death,
carned no possibility of parole); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (holding that the admission of
a codefendant's confession that implicated the defendant at a joint trial constituted prejudicial error even though
the trial court gave a clear instruction that the confession must be disregarded with respect to the defendant
because "the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored").
211. ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 110 (2000).
212. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Phillip Morris Co., 138 F.Supp. 2d 357, 368 (E.D.NY. 2001).
213. 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
214. Id. at 174.
215. Id. at 177.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 178.
219. Id. at 191.
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admission., 22 0 As for the risk of prejudice, the Court stated that "there can be no
question" that the name or nature of the prior offense carried a risk of "lur[ing] a
juror into a sequence of bad character reasoning. 2 2 1
Despite the reversal, the Court was careful to limit its holding to "cases
,,222 toinvolving proof of felon status, and took pains to point out that as a general
matter it is "unquestionably true" that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case
by evidence of its own choice: "The 'fair and legitimate weight' of conventional
evidence showing individual thoughts and acts amounting to a crime reflects the
fact that making a case with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the
formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive rich-
ness."
223
Justice Souter acknowledged that "[e]vidence... has force beyond any linear
scheme of reasoning, and as its pieces come together a narrative gains momentum,
with power not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors
to draw the inferences, whatever they may be, necessary to reach an honest
verdict., 22 4 Moreover, he recognized a "need for evidence in all its particularity to
satisfy the jurors' expectations about what proper proof should be," and argued that
jurors whose expectations are not satisfied may penalize the party who disappoints
them.225 Finally, Justice Souter summarized:
A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom may be no
match for the robust evidence that would be used to prove it. People who hear a
story interrupted by gaps of abstraction may be puzzled at the missing
chapters, and jurors asked to rest a momentous decision on the story's truth can
feel put upon at being asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be
said than they have heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, but
when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative evidence,
an assurance that the missing link is really there is never more than second
best.2 2 6
With respect to Old Chief, however, Souter stated that the "recognition that the
prosecution with its burden of persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a
continuous story has.., virtually no application when the point at issue is a
defendant's legal status, dependent on some judgment rendered wholly indepen-
dently of the concrete events of later criminal behavior charged against him.",
22 7
Old Chief's stipulation did not leave a "gap" in the prosecution's present story,
220. Id. at 186.
221. Id. at 185.
222. Id. at 183 n.7.
223. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
224. Id. (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 188.
226. Id. at 189.
227. Id. at 190.
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Souter claimed, because it "neither displaces a chapter from a continuous sequence
of conventional evidence nor comes across as an officious substitution, to confuse
or offend or provoke reproach.
228
Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia
and Justice Thomas. Justice O'Connor disputed Justice Souter's conclusion that
admission of Old Chief's criminal record was unfairly prejudicial.229 Justice
O'Connor was particularly troubled by what she called the majority's "retreat from
the fundamental principle that in a criminal prosecution the Government may
prove its case as it sees fit."' 230 It is just as likely, she wrote, that a jury will be
"puzzled by the 'missing chapter' resulting from a defendant's stipulation to his
prior felony conviction .... The jury may wonder why it has not been told the
name of the crime, or it may question why the defendant's firearm possession was
illegal... ,,231 Thus, there was disagreement about how much detail was needed
to tell the story properly, as well as what the trade-off between storytelling and the
risk of prejudice should be, but unanimity that storytelling matters.23 2
More recently, in House v. Bell, the Court made reference yet again to the
importance of narrative in a criminal trial. In rejecting the state's argument that
new evidence establishing that semen found on the victim's clothing belonged to
her husband rather than to the defendant, House, was immaterial because no sexual
assault was charged, the Court observed that "[w]hen the only direct evidence of
sexual assault drops out of the case, so, too, does a central theme in the State's
narrative linking House to the crime., 233 The Court then analyzed how a change in
this particular item of evidence would impact how the jury saw the entire story:
A jury informed that fluids on [the victim's] garments could have come from
House might have found that House trekked the nearly two miles to the
victim's home and lured her away in order to commit a sexual offense. By
contrast a jury acting without the assumption that the semen could have come
from House would have found it necessary to establish some different motive,
or, if the same motive, an intent far more speculative.
234
In light of this change in the story, the Court observed, a jury might view other
circumstantial evidence against House as "still potentially incriminating," but
nonetheless far "less suspicious.
235
228. Id. at 191.
229. Id. at 192-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 198 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
232. See Brooks, supra note 113, at 2 (arguing that it is error to "promote a naive positive valuation of
narrative, assuming without further examination that stories are good, and represent the good cause" because "in
fact narrative is morally a chameleon that can be used to support the worse as well as the better cause").
233. House v. Bell, 126 S.Ct 2064, 2079 (2006).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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In the context of third party guilt cases, then, which story should the jury be
permitted to hear-or perhaps it is better to ask how much story should the jury be
given? Jurors expect parties to tell a story about the events of a crime that makes
sense. They expect a story that possesses "narrative integrity. '236 Some jurors
serving on a criminal case may be unwilling or unable to follow legal instructions
requiring them to acquit simply if there is "reasonable doubt"-they want to know
who did it. Others may be influenced in their assessment whether reasonable doubt
is present by whether there is another plausible suspect, and for still others, the
evidence of the alternative perpetrator may by itself create a reasonable doubt. The
prosecutor in Bobby Holmes's case recognized this reality and took advantage of it
in his closing argument by asking, "If Bobby Holmes didn't do this, where is the
fellow who did? ' 237 When there is credible evidence of a third party's potential
guilt, then strict restrictions on admissibility of such evidence unreasonably
infringe upon a criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense and his
right to a fair trial before a jury.
On occasion, such as in Old Chief and House, courts have openly acknowledged
the idea and import of narrative relevance.238 For the most part, however, the legal
world fails to focus on "'narrative' as a category in the process of legal adjudica-
tion.''2 39 We suggest it is time to look more carefully at the role of narrative
relevance, beginning with third party guilt cases, and reconsider our standards in
light of what we know about the narrative's role in the jury decision-making
process. In the remaining part of this Article, we propose a rule for the admissibil-
236. Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 183.
237. See Joint Appendix Vol. u1, supra note 3, at 264, 338.
238. See also Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris Co., 138 FSupp. 2d 357, 366-67
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
The horn-book requirement for admitting evidence is based on the premise that jurors will
evaluate evidence rationally, by applying it logically to one material proposition after another, in
determining whether the elements of the cause of action have been proved to the requisite degree
of probability.
Traditional theory assumes that a jury will decide the relationship between the law and the facts
of the case as if solving a puzzle in logic-viewing evidence in pieces and discretely evaluating
their connection through formal principles. This view is manifested in the way we assume jurors
generally follow instructions and apply law to facts.
More recently philosophical, psychological, and trial advocacy literature, as well as studies of
juries, suggest that jurors reason and process information not merely as Aristotlean logicians, but
somewhat more holistically, in terms of stories they can relate to. This development suggests that
evidence rules may be somewhat loosened in their application-subject to Rule 403 problems of
prejudice-to admit evidence of the practical consequences of a verdict and to give jurors a larger
world context in which to make their decisions.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Shonubi, 895 F.Supp. 460, 482-88 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), vacated by United States v. Shonubi, 103 F.3d 1085 (2d Cir. 1997) (broadly discussing theories about how
decision-makers learn and decide, including classical step-by-step analysis, Bayesian and statistical analyses,
biases and storytelling).
239. Brooks, supra note 113, at 1.
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ity of third party guilt evidence which assures the right to present a "complete
defense" by permitting those defendants with plausible stories to tell them.
V. A PROPOSED RULE
Currently, courts are failing to consider the narrative impact of strict evidentiary
restrictions on third party guilt evidence. While the Supreme Court's decision in
Holmes forbids a court from shutting down the defendant's story solely because it
deems the forensic aspect of the State's story compelling, it neither suggests that
all special third party guilt evidence rules are impermissible nor hints at the
contours of constitutionally acceptable rules. Given what we know about the
importance of narrative in the juror decision-making process, we think that a
revision of special evidentiary rules for third party guilt evidence is in order. To be
consistent with the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial and a complete
defense, such a rule must begin by asking whether the defendant has a story to tell.
A. A Story for the Goose Is a Story for the Gander
How should we measure whether a defendant has a story? A variety of
formulations are possible, but the most attractive is: probable cause. That is, if the
evidence proffered by the defendant-assumed to be credible and taken as a
whole, and regardless of the strength or weaknesses of the State's case-would
permit the State to proceed with a criminal prosecution against the third party, then
the defendant must be permitted to tell the story of third party guilt. Probable cause
determinations require a practical, common-sense assessment of whether, given all
the circumstances, there is a fair probability that the suspect committed the
crime. 24° Probable cause is both the standard used to test whether the defendant
may be arrested, and the standard for determining whether the State may proceed
to trial against the defendant,241 and its use in these other contexts provides two
reasons to recommend it. First, it is familiar, and judges therefore will not need to
struggle with a new standard and the appropriate application of that standard to a
variety of factual situations; the probable cause standard is routinely applied in all
state courts to evidence that is of the very same nature as third party guilt evidence.
240. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (describing probable cause as a flexible, "common sense"
determination). Probable cause does not mean more probable than not. See McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69
(Pa. 1881) ("The substance of all the definitions [of probable cause] is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt."),
quoted in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925). "The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality of the
circumstances." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that
probable cause is satisfied by substantially less evidence than would justify conviction. Locke v. United States, 11
U.S. 339, 348 (1813). The standard simply requires evidence sufficient "'to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. (7 Cranch) 160,
175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162).
241. In some states the grand jury determines whether there is probable cause to issue an indictment, while in
others a judge determines whether there is probable cause to "bind over" the defendant for trial.
1104 [Vol. 44:1069
HeinOnline -- 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1104 2007
EVERY JUROR WANTS A STORY
Second, and more importantly, the probable cause standard compels evenhanded
treatment of the State's claim that it has a non-frivolous reason to believe the
defendant has committed a crime, and the defendant's claim that he has a
non-frivolous reason to believe a third party has committed that crime. A story for
the goose is a story for the gander.
The probable cause standard draws an appropriate line between those defen-
dants who do, in fact, have a coherent story of third party guilt to tell and those who
are just blowing smoke-just as it draws an appropriate line between legitimate
prosecution of suspected crime and unwarranted harassment of potential defen-
dants. Indeed, even if we put aside the emotional toll imposed by unwarranted
prosecution and focus solely on economic costs, courts should be at least as
worried about frivolously embarking upon an entire trial as they should be
concerned about permitting a frivolous detour within a trial. Put differently, if the
justification for special third party guilt rules is the purported risk of confusing,
unwarranted "minitrials" on third party guilt and/or the risk of wrongful acquittals,
that justification cannot be persuasive in situations where we would not find the
risk of confusing, unwarranted prosecutions, and/or the risk of wrongful convic-
tions were the story one being told by the other side.
In our view, the reason for any special rule concerning third party guilt evidence
is not so much because jurors are unable to recognize the smoke-after all, we
assume they can detect prosecution "smoke"-but because we agree that those
defendants whose evidence is so thin that their "story" fails the probable cause
standard should not be allowed to waste the courts' time with speculation-just as
we do not allow prosecutions when the evidence is that thin. Whether this view is
right or not, the probable cause threshold addresses courts' traditional concerns
about the reliability of third party guilt evidence by ensuring that the evidence is at
least of the kind and quantity on which the State itself would rely. If, for example,
the only evidence of third party guilt the defendant has to offer is that the victim's
husband had a motive to kill her for a life insurance policy, such evidence would
not be sufficient to pass the probable cause threshold for the introduction of third
party guilt evidence, just as it would not be sufficient to permit the State to arrest
and/or try the husband for his wife's murder.
Notice that in classic probable cause determinations, proffered evidence must be
presumed to be credible, because the question of credibility is a matter left to the
jury, and to treat like stories alike, that presumption should apply in assessing
whether third party guilt evidence meets the probable cause standard as well.242
Indeed, Holmes does give some guidance on this narrower issue; it makes clear
that a test that rejects third party guilt evidence based on the strength of the state's
evidence is not constitutional.
242. In some jurisdictions, there is a small qualification on this presumption: unless the evidence is not
credible as a matter of law.
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It is also important to notice that all of the proffered evidence must be
considered together, and that such consideration should not make reference to
whether some of the proffered evidence is or may be inadmissible. However, this is
not to say that once the threshold of probable cause is passed, all of the evidence
proffered to meet the probable cause standard is then admissible. Just as it is true
for the prosecution, defense evidence of third party guilt may be subject to
additional evidentiary restrictions.
Once the threshold test is satisfied, we propose that a defendant may admit third
party guilt evidence if that same evidence would be admissible against the third
party were he the defendant. In other words, could the State offer the White
evidence against Jimmy White if the State had opted to try White for the crime
rather than Bobby Holmes? If so, then Bobby Holmes (or any other similarly
situated defendant) should be permitted to offer that same evidence in his defense
at his own trial. If evidence is reliable enough to implicate a defendant, it is reliable
enough to exonerate him. This is only fair,243 in contrast to current third party guilt
evidence standards which are, without exception, applied asymmetrically. Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court has held that evenhanded application is a basic
due process principle. 2"
In particular, a rule that treats the introduction of hearsay statements made
against the declarant's penal interest when offered by the government differently
from such statements when offered by the defendant is not justifiable. Thus, for
example, FRE 804(3), which permits any statement tending to expose the declar-
ant to criminal liability as admissible when offered by the government, but
requires a defendant proffering such a statement to demonstrate "corroborating
circumstances [that] clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement" is
impermissible. While the federal government, or any state, is free to choose to
condition admissibility on corroborating evidence, or even to determine that
statements against penal interest are insufficiently trustworthy to merit an excep-
tion to the hearsay rules under any circumstances, what is impermissible is a rule
that finds a form of evidence is "good enough for government work"-but not
good enough when proffered by the defense.
243. Due process is, after all, about fundamental fairness. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)
(explaining that due process is about "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"' (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (due process entities individuals to "fundamental right[s], essential to a fair trial"
(quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1942))); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (same);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (same); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (due process provides rights
"basic in our system of jurisprudence").
244. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 316 n.12 (1998) (noting that the evidence rule at issue in
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967), was problematic because it burdened only the defense and not the
prosecution); see also Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1452 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the rule in Washington
"did not rationally exclude a class of witnesses particularly likely to lie, because their testimony was considered
sufficiently reliable for use by the prosecution. A rule so arbitrary and unfair served no legitimate state aim; the
rights of the defendant therefore were decisive").
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Washington v. Texas supplies a strong analogy here. In Washington, the Supreme
Court labeled "absurd" the notion "that [co-defendants] will lie to save their
fellows but not to obtain favors from the prosecution for themselves., 245 It is
likewise unwarranted to assume that third parties will willy-nilly make untrue
statements implicating themselves merely to exculpate the defendant, caring
nothing about their own possible incrimination-but will make such statements
only when true if no criminal defendant stands to benefit from the evidence.
Furthermore, an evenhanded rule pays appropriate respect to the jury's role as
the "lie detector. '24 6 Certainly society has an interest in having juries receive all
probative evidence. 47 A story for the goose is a story for the gander, and reliable
for the goose is reliable for the gander. Hearing the defendant's story and admitting
the defendant's evidence when we would hear the State's story and admit its
evidence leaves the credibility and weight of such evidence, and the persuasive-
ness of each story, to the jury's determination. As the Supreme Court has
repeatedly acknowledged, this is the best-and the constitutionally mandated-
method of determining the truth.
24 8
This is not to say that the rationale of each and every state or federal evidentiary
rule is equally applicable to both prosecution and defense proffers of the same
evidence, particularly when the rationale supporting the rule is not simply the
reliability of the evidence, but also reflects due process values. The most salient
and persuasive candidate for differential treatment is the prohibition against
propensity evidence when offered by the State. 249 According to the Supreme
Court, the exclusion of propensity evidence in a criminal case is designed to
protect the defendant from wrongful conviction: "Although... 'propensity evi-
dence' is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than those
charged-or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person
deserves punishment--creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary rel-
evance."2 50 In the case of third party guilt evidence, however, the third party is not
245. 388 U.S. at 22-23.
246. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907,912 (9th Cir. 1973)).
247. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984) (discussing the inevitable discovery exception to the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" exclusionary rule).
248. See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 313 ("Determining the weight and credibility of witness testimony... has long
been held to be the 'part of every case [that] belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their
natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men."' (quoting Aetna Life Ins. v. Ward,
140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891))).
249. This exception applies to evidence which may not be admissible by the State against a defendant under
FED. R. EvD. 404(a) or its state equivalent. Evidence which would otherwise be admissible against a defendant
under FED. R. EvID. 404(b) is not affected by this exception.
250. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 181 (1997) (quoting United States v. Moccia, 681 F.2d 61, 63
(3d Cir. 1982)); see also State v. Trotter, 632 N.W.2d 325, 333-37 (Neb. 2001) ("The exclusion of other bad acts
evidence offered to show a defendant's propensity protects the presumption of innocence and is deeply rooted in
our jurisprudence.").
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on trial and no such risk of wrongful conviction exists.251 In other words, there is
no need to balance the probative value of the third party guilt evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice because the third party suffers no prejudice by the
admission of the evidence at a trial in which he is not the accused. Moreover, when
propensity evidence is offered by the State against a defendant, it exacerbates an
already existing signal of the defendant's guilt. The State's decision to charge and
try a defendant for a crime indicates to jurors that the State strongly believes that
the defendant is guilty and can provide evidence to support this belief. No such
pre-trial signaling occurs in the context of a defendant's decision to offer third
party guilt evidence, and the risk of misuse is consequently much less significant.
Thus, admission of propensity (or other character) evidence concerning a third
party should not be precluded.
B. Applying the Rule
How much difference would an approach based on narrative make? In the truly
weak cases, it would make no difference at all. Thus, in People v. Kirchner,252
where the Illinois Supreme Court upheld exclusion of evidence that a third party
had access to the murder weapon one month before the crime occurred, but where
it was undisputed that the defendant possessed the weapon immediately prior to
and after the crime, the result would be the same under our approach; such
evidence does not even establish opportunity, let alone probable cause. Likewise,
in State v. Malick,253 where a West Virginia court excluded evidence that a third
party had sexually assaulted the same victim in the same month, but where the
defendant conceded that he was the only person present with the victim at the time
of the assault with which he was charged, smoke, not a story, was all that was at
251. Similarly, rules against admission of withdrawn guilty pleas and statements made in the discussion of
such pleas would not apply to third-parties because the exclusion of such statements is intended to protect the
accused's right to withdraw a plea and proceed to trial. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223-24
(1927):
Out of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall
not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the
consequences.... [O]n timely application, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have
been unfairly obtained or given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence .... The court in exercise
of its discretion will permit one accused to substitute a plea of not guilty and have a trial if for any
reason the granting of the privilege seems fair and just.
People v. Spitaleri, 173 N.E.2d 35, 37 (N.Y. 1961).
The question is not whether a plea of guilty is a confession of guilt and provable as such. Of course
it is. But we are inquiring into something quite different. We must say whether it is lawful in New
York for a court, after allowing a guilty plea to be set at naught, to allow the jury to use that same
plea as proof of guilt. Such a distortion of purpose should not be allowed.
Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Since the third party's right to trial is not affected by admission
of such statements, there is no need to exclude them.
252. 743 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. 2001).
253. 457 S.E.2d 482 (W. Va. 1995).
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stake, and the smoke was properly excluded.
On the other hand, a focus on narrative and application of the probable cause
threshold would result in a different outcome in Bryant v. State. Seventeen year old
John Bryant was living with his father Lee, and stepmother, Carol. Bryant had
previously been living with his mother, Kristi, but moved in with his father and
stepmother after Kristi determined she could no longer control her son's behavior.
Bryant had been adjudicated a juvenile delinquent for committing a number of
offenses, including stealing from Kristi, threatening her with a baseball bat and
choking her on one occasion. Bryant had also threatened to kill his stepmother
Carol and expressed hostility toward her in some poetry he had written.254
On Tuesday, January 4, 2000, Bryant and Carol got into an argument. When
Bryant's father, Lee, returned from work the next day, he found a note from Bryant
explaining that he was going to spend the night with a friend. Carol never returned
home. Two days later, Lee reported Carol missing. The police eventually discov-
ered Carol's car along a state highway. Her dead body was found in the trunk of the
car, wrapped in a blanket. She died from asphyxiation as a result of ligature
strangulation. The police arrested Bryant the next day.
255
At trial, the State offered evidence that Bryant had driven Carol's car near the
time of her disappearance; that Bryant told his mother, Kristi, that he could not
take any more of Carol's "crap"; and that a pair of Bryant's jeans recovered from
the trunk of Carol's car contained Carol's body fluids. The State also put on
evidence that Bryant listened to rap music and spent time re-writing the lyrics to
certain songs, including one which referenced placing a body in the trunk of a
car.
256
Bryant's defense was that his father, Lee, had committed the murder. He made
offers of proof to demonstrate that Carol and Lee's relationship was violent and
that Carol wanted to leave Lee. Several witnesses proposed to testify that Lee had a
long history of physically attacking Carol; that Lee would often choke Carol
during these attacks; and that Carol had told several friends and neighbors that Lee
said he would kill her. The trial court excluded this evidence as irrelevant and as
hearsay. The jury convicted Bryant and he was sentenced to a total of eighty-one
and one-half years in prison.2 57 The Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the exclu-
sion, stating that there was no exception to the hearsay rule under which Lee's
statement could be admitted, and that the trial court properly concluded that the
evidence concerning Lee's history of abuse was "too remote to have any probative
value. ' 2 5 8 The court also accused Bryant of trying to "proffer[] this evidence to
establish the 'forbidden inference' that if Lee had choked Carol before, then he
254. 802 N.E.2d 486, 491 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
255. Id. at 492.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 492-93.
258. Id. at497.
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likely choked her and caused her death., 259 Finally, the court rejected Bryant's
argument that he was denied the opportunity to present a defense because the trial
court did permit him to present limited evidence of Lee's prior bad acts against
Carol that were "closer in time to the date of her murder.,
260
Here, we would classify the Bryant case as one in which the defendant had a
story that he was entitled to tell. First, Bryant amassed evidence that a third
party-his father, Lee-had a motive, opportunity, and propensity to commit the
crime. The statements from Lee and Carol's neighbors about Lee's previous
attacks, their strained marriage, and Lee's statement that he would kill Carol are
more than sufficient to establish probable cause for Lee's arrest. Thus, Bryant had
a coherent story of third party guilt and, to protect his constitutional right to present
a complete defense, he should have been permitted to tell that story to the jurors,
whose job it is to hear and evaluate it for themselves.
Second, any evidence that would be admissible against Lee if Lee were charged
with Carol's murder rather than Bryant, should have been admissible in Bryant's
case to support his story of an alternative perpetrator. Thus, evidence that Lee had a
long history of abuse against Carol, that Lee had choked Carol on previous
occasions, and that Lee had threatened to kill her is admissible under our test.
Indeed, this would be true even if the evidence had been that Lee had choked other
women in the past. As we have previously explained, the policy reasons underlying
strict limits on the admissibility of prior criminal conduct against the defendant lest
it be used to infer propensity simply do not apply to the use of propensity evidence
to implicate third parties. Evidence that Lee had a propensity to abuse and choke
Carol-even if too old to be admitted against Lee himself, were he tried for Carol's
murder-is relevant to Bryant's story that Lee, not Bryant, was the actual
perpetrator of the crime, and is therefore admissible.
Moreover, the Indiana court's determination that Bryant's right to present a
defense was not infringed because he was permitted to offer some evidence in
support of Lee's guilt demonstrates precisely why a new standard, which better
accounts for the narrative relevance of evidence, is necessary. That Bryant may
have been permitted to tell the jury about one or two specific instances of abuse
does not provide the jury with the kind of complete, detailed narrative about Lee
and Carol's violent history that Bryant wanted to tell. Without the complete
picture, the jury was unable to hear a cohesive story of Lee's guilt and therefore
had little alternative but to accept the state's counter-narrative of Bryant's guilt.
Because the Indiana court failed to understand the narrative import of Bryant's
entire story, his ability to present a complete defense was unconstitutionally
restricted.
A final example may be useful in demarcating the limits of our test. Valdez was
259. Id. at 497-98.
260. Id. at 498.
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convicted of a robbery-murder in California. The evidence at trial showed that
Valdez was one of the last people seen with the victim before his death and that he
was seen running from the area near the crime shortly after it occurred.26 1 Valdez
proposed to offer evidence that when the investigating officer, Detective Guenther,
arrived at the scene of the crime, he noticed bloody shoe prints leading toward an
alley away from the victim's house.2 6 2 In the alley, Detective Guenther discovered
a group of young men and approached one of the individuals, Liberato Gutierrez,
who was "extremely nervous" and "shaking. 263 Detective Guenther arrested
Gutierrez after observing a spot of blood on his shirt and two spots of blood on one
of his boots.
The prosecution objected to the testimony: "Your honor, in-what counsel I
think is trying to elicit in this manner is, in fact, that Liberato Gutierrez could be
the murderer in this case. '264 Defense counsel emphatically disagreed:
The purpose of bringing up Liberato Gutierrez, the blood and the shoes, is not
what the People are articulating in any shape, fashion, or form. The purpose,
your honor, is that you have a very serious matter, you have a murder
investigation that's going on. You have footprints that have been established by
shoes.... You have an individual who has blood on his shirt, there is-the
testimony will be that the blood has not been analyzed.265
Defense counsel also stated that he wanted to discuss the bloody footprints because
they had not been analyzed at all and the police had not explained why the prints
were not compared to at least three other men who were in the area at the time of
the crime:
It is not pointing a finger at Mr. Liberato Gutierrez and saying you're the killer,
you're the one that took the money. That's not the issue. The issue has to do
with whether or not these 12 people can believe and rely upon the investigation
that was performed by the Pomona Police Department as well as the Sheriff's
Department. And it's important for them to have that information and for them
to evaluate that information.266
The trial court sustained the prosecution's objection to the testimony, ruling:
"The court finds that the probative value of that testimony is outweighed by the
necessity of undue consumption of further time. It would create a substantial
danger of confusing the issues and of misleading the jury. ,26' The Supreme Court
of California agreed, stating that third party guilt evidence should be treated "like
261. People v. Valdez, 82 P.3d 296, 306, 310 (Cal. 2004).
262. Id. at 302.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 302-03 (omission in original) (emphasis omitted).
266. Id. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
267. Id.
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any other evidence. It is admissible if it is relevant and its probative value is 'not
substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion.' 268
The court then held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that
the probative value of an attack on the investigation was minimal and thus,
properly excluded.269
Valdez's story, although perhaps important to the presentation of his defense, is
not really about third party guilt. It is instead about a sloppy police investigation,
upon which Valdez claimed the jury should not rely in finding him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.27 0 Although Valdez may have been able to establish probable
cause against a particular individual and thereby tell a coherent story of third party
guilt, he did not try to do so. Instead, he chose to tell a different kind of story---one
which our test does not address. 27 t That probable cause is the right threshold for
third party guilt stories derives from the fact that in telling such stories, the
defendant is telling the same kind of story as is the State when it prosecutes a
defendant.
CONCLUSION
"A Story is only half told if only one side has been presented.,
272
Then there came two women that were harlots unto the king, and stood before
him. And the one woman said, 0 my lord, I and this woman dwell in one house,
and I was delivered of a child with her in the house. And it came to pass the
third day after that I was delivered, that this woman was delivered also: and we
were together, there was no stranger in the house, save we two in the house.
And this woman's child died in the night; because she overlaid it. And she
arose at midnight, and took my son from beside me, while thine handmaid
slept, and laid it in her bosom, and laid her dead child in my bosom. And when
I arose in the morning to give my child suck, behold, it was dead: but when I
268. Id. at 304 n.10.
269. Id. at 304.
270. In most cases, every item of evidence a defendant introduces is in some way an attempt to show that
someone else committed the crime, and thus might be called "third party guilt evidence"; only in cases where the
defendant claims that his actions were justified or excused, or that no crime occurred at all, is the defendant not
claiming that a third party was guilty. But in this Article, we have used the term "third party guilt evidence" in a
more narrow sense-one in which the defendant desires to point to a specific third party as the alternative
perpetrator of the crime with which he is charged.
271. Another example is the modus operandi cases-in which the defendant claims he could not have
committed the crime because other crimes with the same modus operandi were committed at a time when it was
for some reason impossible for the defendant have been the perpetrator, for example, he was incarcerated at the
time. See, e.g., State v. Cook, 847 A.2d 530 (N.J. 2004) (discussing a case in which the defendant advanced a
modus operandi defense). The evidence in these cases may or may not make out probable cause against a specific
nameable third party, but whether the third party is known or not does not determine whether a coherent story has
been told; it is, however, a different kind of story.
272. Icelandic proverb.
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had considered it in the morning, behold, it was not my son, which I did
bear.
2 7 3
And then King Solomon ordered the baby to be given to the woman who told this
story.
Well, no, of course not. He let the second woman tell her story, which accused
the first woman of the same crime: stealing her child. After hearing both stories,
Solomon used his wisdom (a cross-examination of sorts) to determine who was
telling the truth. Most jurors don't have Solomonic wisdom, but in criminal cases,
they are the only Solomons we have; in cases with competing accusations, jurors
need to hear both stories before they pronounce a judgment.
273. 1 Kings 3:16-21 (King James).
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